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Administrative agencies play a crucial role in American government, so
unsurprisingly,their actionssometimes threaten individual rights. Despite this
threat, courts determining whether a constitutional individual right has been
violatedoften ignore thefact and nature of administrativeaction. Indeed, in a
wide range of cases alleging the violation of an individual right, the Supreme
Court reflexively defers to the government without asking whether
administrative officials or more directly accountablepolitical representatives
were responsiblefor the alleged infringement. Even when the Court identifies
these distinctions, its treatment is inconsistentand inchoate.
This Article argues that courts should more consistently and carefully
consider the nature of administrative discretion when determining whether an
agency has violated a substantive individual right. Instead of casually
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conflating administrative and legislative action, courts deciding such cases
should identify the relevant constitutional actor. When that actor is an agency,
courts should then draw on administrative law norms to examine whether the
agency deserves deference. Such an approach would help courts avoid the
unjustified deference they sometimes offer agencies in individual rights cases,
thus encouraging constitutionaladherence and assuring independentjudicial
evaluation ofthe alleged constitutionalinjury.
INTRODUCTION

In a famous, highly contested affirmative action decision, the United States
Supreme Court in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke struck down
the admissions procedure of the Medical School of the University of California
at Davis.1 In announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Powell explained
that the admissions policy benefiting racial minorities was problematic in part
because it reflected not a legislative preference but the medical school's own
judgment about the virtues of affirmative action. 2 "[I]solated segments of our
vast governmental structures," Powell wrote, "are not competent to make those
decisions [about affirmative action], at least in the absence of legislative
mandates and legislatively determined criteria." 3
The fact that an
administrativeagency, and not the state legislature, had crafted the challenged
4
policy, then, played a significant role in the Court's ruling.
Twenty-five years later, the Court confronted another high-profile graduate
school affirmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger.5 In Grutter, the Court
upheld the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action admissions
plan. 6 Unlike the Court in Bakke, the Grutter Court seemed unconcerned that
the university, and not the state legislature, had designed the challenged policy.
Indeed, far from following Bakke's reasoning, Grutter explicitly deferred to
the "university's academic decisions," 7 even though California and Michigan
had delegated similar authority to their universities. 8 Whereas Bakke had
I Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
2 Though Justice Powell wrote only for himself, his opinion announcing the Court's
judgment has since "served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious
admissions policies." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003).
3 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309.
4 State universities are generally considered state administrative agencies. See, e.g., Clay
v. Tex. Women's Univ., 728 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1984) (treating a state university as a
state agency).
1 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6 A companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-76 (2003), invalidated the
affirmative action plan of the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts. See infra Parts I.A.2, III.A. 1 .b.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
8 See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a) (delegating authority over the University of California
to the "Regents of the University of California"); MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (delegating
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faulted the State for permitting determinations with significant constitutional
implications to be made by administrative agencies without legislative
guidance, Grutter appeared to give special deference to those same agencies.
Of course, a great deal more could be said about both cases, but Bakke and
Grutter's different approaches to administrative discretion is striking,
especially because the Court fails to acknowledge, let alone justify, the
discrepancy.
Far from being anomalous, this discrepancy reflects a deeper phenomenon
in constitutional doctrine in which the Court's consideration of administrative
discretion in individual rights cases is inconsistent and inchoate. Oftentimes
this judicial insensitivity to the distinctions between actions taken by
administrative agencies and by more directly accountable political
representatives results in reflexive, unstudied deference to administrative
actors. Given courts' and scholars' great anxiety that judicial review is
counter-majoritarian, 9 this casual conflation of elected officials with unelected
administrative agents is surprising. Judicial review is problematic, Alexander
Bickel famously argued, because it allows unelected judges to overturn the
policies of elected, politically accountable legislatures or chief executives.' 0
One might accordingly assume that judicial review would be less problematic,
perhaps even desirable, when unelected, less accountable officials design the
challenged policies. Separation of powers, federalism, and other factors might
still militate for some deference in some circumstances, but to the extent
judicial deference in constitutional cases rests substantially on politicalauthority grounds, it is strange that the Court would defer reflexively to
unaccountable administrative agents without inquiring into their underlying
democratic legitimacy. "
This concern is especially important to our constitutional scheme in the age
of the administrative state. Administrative agencies play a crucial role in
United States government,' 2 and officials within these agencies often possess
authority over the University of Michigan to the "Regents of the University of Michigan");
infra note 342 and accompanying text.
9 See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME

COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).

'oSee id. at 16-17 ("[Wlhen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act
or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but
against it.").
11See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment,
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 1, 43

(2010) (arguing that judicial review is often premised on political authority); Paul Horwitz,
Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1061, 1078 (2008) (arguing that courts
defer typically for reasons of"legal authority").
12 See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES

AND COMMENTS 9 (rev. 10th ed. 2003) (stating that almost everything the government does
is agency action).
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great discretion. 13 The exercise of that discretion will sometimes intrude on
various individual rights. 14 Given that much of the injustice in our society
results from the exercise of administrative discretion, 15 the U.S. Supreme
Court's failure to address these issues potentially under-protects important
constitutional liberties. In deferring repeatedly to agencies in individual rights
cases, the Court, despite bold pronouncements of judicial supremacy
elsewhere, 16 has at times effectively, if perhaps unwittingly, surrendered to
agency bureaucrats its self-appointed prerogative of declaring constitutional
meaning.
To the extent the Court does entertain these issues its approach has been
erratic. Sometimes the Court denies deference because an agency has invaded
individual rights. 17 Sometimes it denies deference because unbridled
administrative discretion creates too much risk for constitutional
infringement. 18 Even when the Court identifies these issues, however, it fails
to develop a coherent, systematic approach.
Of course, more careful consideration of these administrative considerations
does arise in certain kinds of cases. Procedural due process cases, for instance,
focus on administrative procedures. Qualified and absolute immunity cases
likewise determine when officials can be held liable for damages and thus
consider the scope of administrative discretion. 19 Such cases, however, are
beyond my focus. My attention is to cases in which the Court must determine
the scope of an (non-procedural due process) individual right and whether an
administrative actor has violated that right.20 In these cases, the Court's
13 Professor Davis offers a succinct definition of "discretion," explaining that "[a] public

officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a
KENNETH GULP DAVIS,
choice among possible courses of action or inaction."
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1969).
14 See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation,101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2409-10 (2003) ("The considerable
discretion that many official decisionmakers wield raises the spectre that violations of
equality norms will sometimes escape detection.").
'" See DAVIS, supra note 13, at 25 (suggesting that nine-tenths of injustice to individuals
results from governmental discretion).
16 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.").
17See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 98-99 (1976); infra Part I.B.1.
"8See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) ("The
First Amendment prohibits the vesting of such unbridled discretion in a government
official."); infra Part I.B.2.
19See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
20 By "individual rights cases," I refer to cases interpreting the substantive protections
afforded individuals under the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment - as opposed
to, for instance, cases considering whether immunity doctrine shields an official from
liability. I also include habeas corpus, because even though the Suspension Clause certainly
can be considered an Article I structural provision, it also protects an individual right to
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determination about whether to defer to administrative actors - and whether
the nature of administrative discretion should affect the scope21 of the
substantive right in particular circumstances - is decidedly haphazard.
Phrased somewhat differently, when the Court decides whether to defer to
administrative agencies in these individual rights cases, it often ignores both
the fact and nature of administrative action. In so doing, the Court downplays
the constitutional "who," effectively treating the legislature, chief executive,
and administrative officials all as roughly equivalent incarnations of "the
government" with the same democratic legitimacy. 22 In cases involving
agencies, the Court also often shortchanges the constitutional "how," ignoring
whether the administrative officials' behavior merits deference.
This Article contends that courts should consult ordinary administrative law
norms before deciding whether to give deference to agencies in constitutional
individual rights cases.
By "deference," I mean courts' practice of
constraining their review of governmental action based not upon an analysis of
the substantive constitutional issue (e.g., free speech, equal protection) but
rather upon institutional concerns regarding courts' relationships with the other
branches of government. 23 By "ordinary administrative law norms," I refer
generally to the statutory and regulatory inquiries that courts frequently pursue
in cases decided under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and related
doctrines or under canons of statutory interpretation commonly applied in

petition for judicial review of the legality of one's detention. See Eve Brensike Primus, A
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2010) (summarizing but
ultimately rejecting "a long tradition of understanding habeas review as a straightforward
matter of individual rights"). Though my analysis draws on procedural due process norms, I
do not focus on those cases, because they necessarily account for the nature of agency
decision making and therefore address these issues more consistently than many other
individual-rights cases. See infra note 106.
21 My analysis, therefore, puts to the side issues such as standing, immunity, exhaustion,
and other obstacles that can interfere with challenges to official action.
22 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1209, 1210 (2010) (arguing that courts too often ignore the identity of the constitutional
actor). In fairness, the Court does sometimes consider the constitutional "who," such as in
federalism cases regarding the scope of congressional authority. See, e.g., Lopez v. United
States, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (explaining that states, not the federal government, have
historically been sovereign over areas like education, crime, and family law). My focus
here is individual rights cases in which the governmental actor is a federal or state
administrative agency as opposed to a legislature or chief executive.
23 See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214-17 (1978) (explaining that judicial
restraint rests "not upon analysis of the constitutional concept but upon various concerns of
the Court about its institutional role," such as "the propriety of unelected federal judges'
displacing the judgments of elected state officials, or upon the competence of federal courts
to prescribe workable standards of state conduct and devise measures to enforce them").
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cases involving administrative agencies. 24 Courts applying these norms in
individual rights cases should ask, first, whether the relevant governmental
actor is an administrative agency.2 5 If it is, courts should then examine
administrative law norms - namely, the agency's political authority, expertise,
and procedural regularity - before deciding whether to defer. Judicial
deference to the agency in constitutional individual rights cases, as distinct
from the familiar Chevron deference in statutory interpretation cases, 26 should
then occur on a sliding scale, hinging on those inquires. Indeed, unlike
Chevron cases in which the agency has both presumptive expertise over the
relevant subject matter and delegated authority to interpret the statute it
administers, in constitutional cases agencies have no special claim to
Accordingly, courts considering constitutional
interpretive authority. 27
challenges to agency action should not defer reflexively without inquiring
more carefully into the administrative framework within which the agency has
28
operated.

24

1 refer to this administrative law as "ordinary" to distinguish administrative law rooted

in statutory, regulatory, and other non-constitutional requirements from constitutional based
requirements. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 527-33 (2003)
(distinguishing between "ordinary" administrative law norms, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and constitutional-based administrative law norms); Gillian E. Metzger,
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479,
483 (2010) (referring to the "ordinary" components of administrative law as statutory and
regulatory requirements, such as the APA, Executive Order 12,866, and associated
Ultimately, the distinction between "ordinary" and
administrative law doctrines).
"constitutional" administrative law is not crucial to my argument, though the relevance of
"ordinary" administrative law norms to constitutional individual rights cases might appear
more provocative, insofar as the Court only sporadically explores these norms in individual
rights cases.
25 I define "agency" broadly to encompass federal, state, and local entities performing
some kind of public or quasi-public function. My inquiry therefore addresses not just
agencies, departments, bureaus, and the like but also other official actors, such as university
administrators, prison officials, and so on. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2006) (defining
"agency" broadly); PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 148
(2d ed. 2002) ("The scholarly view of administrative law has grown, with government, to
embrace almost all adjectival subjects that can be connected with public administration.").
26 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984) (providing for deference to agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguities within
the statutes they administer).
27 See id. at 865 (speculating that Congress might have "consciously desired the
Administrator to strike the [proper policy balance] thinking that those with great expertise
and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position
to do so"); Mont. Chapter of Ass'n of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Young, 514 F.2d 1165,
1167 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[F]ederal administration agencies have neither the power nor
competence to pass on the constitutionality of statutes.").
28 My analysis does not address other kinds of "deference" that frequently arise in
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Courts, in fact, are well equipped to engage in such inquiries, because they
frequently apply them in administrative law cases. A core purpose of
administrative law is to contain the discretion of administrative officials
without debilitating them.2 9 Administrative law factors, then, can help courts
flesh out whether agencies deserve the deference the judiciary often reflexively
grants them. Admittedly, courts will not always calibrate deference perfectly
based on these factors, but given that they make deference determinations
anyway, the proposed approach would make such inquiries more transparent
and nuanced. Such an approach, though hardly the norm in constitutional
rights cases, also would not be wholly anomalous. As we shall see, the Court
occasionally does consider such factors and sometimes expresses concern
when unconstrained official discretion heightens the risk of constitutional
violation.
Scholars have paid surprisingly little attention to these concerns. Matthew
Adler has examined Bickel's counter-majoritarian difficulty in light of the
unique features of the administrative state, 30 and Gillian Metzger has explored
the constitutional character of ordinary administrative law. 31
But
administrative law's relevance to constitutional individual rights cases remains
under-explored. Given that administrative action allegedly inflicting injustice
on individuals frequently escapes review under administrative law, this is a
crucial facet of constitutional rights jurisprudence that has been neglected for
32
too long.
To be clear, such deference determinations should not comprise the entire
constitutional inquiry. Courts do and should also consider, among other
things, the nature of the constitutional right at issue and the effect on the
individual whose rights arguably have been violated. Courts also should
consider contextual factors limiting the appropriateness of this inquiry in some
circumstances. My theory, then, should be applied flexibly and should not
displace current individual rights doctrine. Instead, I propose that courts take
administrative law cases, such as deference to an agency's factual record or deference to an
agency's statutory interpretation.
29 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1676-88 (1975).
30 See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 765-66 (1997) (arguing that the rise
of the administrative state renders Bickel's account of the counter-majoritarian difficulty
incomplete).
31 See Metzger, supra note 24, at 505-12 (discussing the "constitutional common law
character of ordinary administrative law"); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law
as the New Federalism,57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2047-71 (2008) (discussing "administrative law
as a federalism vehicle").
32 See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 369, 409 (1989) (arguing that judicial supervision is necessary to ensure that
legislatures and the agencies to which they delegate do not "oppress private persons" by
violating individual rights).
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account of the fact and nature of administrative action when they make their
(often implicit) decision to defer to governmental actors on institutional
grounds. After courts make the deference determination, they would then
apply the substantive constitutional analysis, such as the relevant tier of
scrutiny. Deference determinations, in other words, would provide one lens
through which courts should conduct the rest of its constitutional analysis.
This approach would have several benefits. First, courts would make more
careful deference determinations, paying greater attention to the particulars of
the agency action at issue. Second, and relatedly, whereas reflexive deference
leaves the meaning of the Constitution to administrative agents, who often lack
the authority and expertise to make such pronouncements, a more careful
approach to deference can help assure independent judicial evaluation of the
alleged injury. 33 Third, attention to administrative law norms in individual

rights cases would help create incentives for governmental actors to act
responsibly when implementing policies that might infringe on individual
rights. Given that the administrative state is so pervasive, that agency
bureaucrats exercise such great discretion, and that administrative law itself
sometimes does not constrain agency action, such institutional incentives are
essential to maintaining a healthy balance between workable administrative
processes and individual rights. 34 Fourth, this approach would encourage more
accountable officials to make important decisions impacting constitutional
rights, thereby promoting democratic accountability. Finally, my analysis
highlights that administrative agencies play a crucial role, not only in setting
35
policy but also in shaping constitutional norms.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys several Supreme Court
constitutional individual rights cases involving administrative agencies. It
begins with cases in which the Court reflexively defers to the agency
responsible for the challenged policy, even though the Court does not always
take such an approach in related cases. It then turns to cases in which the
Court does not defer, for fear of giving agencies too much unbridled authority.
33 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

89 (1969) (warning that unconsidered judicial deference to administrative pronouncements
can allow those pronouncements to "establish[] themselves without any formal sanction at
all from anybody authorized to state or establish the law of the land"); Henry P. Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522 (1970) (arguing that free
speech principles require judicial, rather than solely administrative, evaluation of speakers'
rights).
" See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1687, 1706 (2004) ("[F]reedom and authority are forever in conflict, and it is mainly
through the interlocking roles and parts of government that the tension is worked out. The
failure to understand public structures, then, is a failure to understand the essence of either
liberty or order.").
35 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 29-74 (2010) (discussing administrative constitutionalism and
agencies' role in defining constitutional norms).
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Part I concludes by acknowledging that different doctrines and circumstances
largely account for the Court's different approaches but argues that the Court
nonetheless fails to offer a coherent, consistent theory about how the fact and
nature of administrative action affect its deference determinations.
Part II argues that courts should turn to administrative law norms to help
determine when they should defer to administrative officials in individual
rights cases. It opens by contending that ordinary administrative law sensibly
could provide standards in such cases, because it is often constitutionally
inspired and uniquely concerned with how administrative agencies exercise
their discretion. Part II then proceeds to examine particular administrative law
factors courts should consult, including political authority, expertise, and
adherence to standard procedures. It concludes by explaining how these
factors will operate within the doctrinal analysis and by discussing contextual
limitations that will require judicial flexibility in some circumstances.
Part III considers applications, advantages, and implications of this
proposal. In particular, Part III applies the theory to many of the cases
discussed in Part I, thus demonstrating how the Court's analysis might have
been more careful and nuanced had it kept these factors in mind.
I.

THE COURT'S INCONSISTENT APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION IN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASES

Deference to Agency Action

A.

The Supreme Court in the cases discussed here mostly ignored
administrative law norms and deferred to the governmental actor. 36 Different
factors may have driven the deference in different cases, but in each case the
Court deferred to an administrative agency without fully exploring the
processes underlying that agency's actions - and, sometimes, without even
acknowledging that agency, rather than legislative, policy was at issue. Most
curiously, the Court in these cases also failed to explain fully why deference
was appropriate in light of less deferential approaches in similar cases. To this
extent, the Court's deference determinations are poorly justified and
inadequately theorized.
Deference in Baze v. Rees and the Court's Puzzling Preference for
Agency Action
Baze v. Rees37 demonstrates the Court's penchant in some situations for
deferring reflexively without carefully examining the relevant governmental
actors. 38 The plaintiffs argued that Kentucky's lethal injection procedure
1.

36 Part III revisits each of these cases in light of the theory proposed in Part II.
37 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion).

38 Consistent with the Court's precedent, this Article treats Chief Justice Roberts's
plurality opinion in Baze as the Court's holding. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
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created a substantial risk of excruciating pain in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment. '39 In
rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge, the Court emphasized40 the discretion states
should enjoy when they implement execution procedures.
In so doing, Baze ignored the constitutional "who" and "how." It ignored
the "who" by conflating state Departments of Corrections (DOCs) and prison
guards with the state legislature. In most states with capital punishment,
including Kentucky, the state legislature delegates the lethal injection
procedure to DOC officials, who typically design the procedures and then
instruct prison guards or independent contractors to carry them out. 41 The
plurality, however, ignored this delegation, warning that courts should not
"substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their
execution procedures. '42 Baze thus afforded DOC officials and prison guards
the same kind of deference the Court affords state legislatures. To be sure, the
state legislature had deliberately delegated broad discretion to the DOC. But
the Baze challenge contended that the lethal injection procedure as
implemented carried an intolerable risk of excruciating pain, and DOC officials43
and prison guards, not legislators, implemented the procedure's details.
Regardless of whether the plaintiffs had a compelling case, deference
predicated on the legislature's (minimal) involvement was badly misplaced
given that the claim challenged the execution procedure's details.
Baze also ignored the "how" by assuming that the procedures were designed
and implemented competently. 44 As some lower courts have recognized, many
states have adopted lethal injection with neither expertise nor
professionalism. 45 Indeed, many states' procedures, including Kentucky's, are
carried out in secret by prison guards who lack expertise in the drugs and
188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (plurality opinion).
40 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (plurality opinion).
41 See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 259, 302-03 (2009); Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures
Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal
Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. LJ. 63, 116-25 (2002).
42 Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
43 See Berger, supra note 41, at 266-72 (explaining that the constitutionality of a lethal
injection procedure turns substantially on its risk of pain, which turns on how responsible
officials in a given state administer the procedure).
4 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (plurality opinion) (citing states' scientific expertise).
41 See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (describing
California's "pervasive lack of professionalism" with regards to lethal injection); Taylor v.
Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *3-6 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (describing
Missouri's failure to carefully design lethal injection procedure).
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The Court,
guidance from professionals possessing that expertise. 46
nevertheless, failed to explore thoroughly the qualifications of the relevant
personnel and the rigor of the administrative procedures used to adopt lethal
injection. In short, the Court deferred without considering whether the State
47
deserved deference.
Interestingly, in other death penalty cases, the Court engages in far more
rigorous scrutiny. In Eighth Amendment capital proportionality cases, for
instance, the Court views much more skeptically legislatively sanctioned
capital punishments that are arguably disproportionate to the nature of the
crime or particular characteristics of the criminal. For example, less than three
months after Baze, the Court held in Kennedy v. Louisiana that capital
48
punishment was disproportionately severe punishment for the rape of a child.
Other Eighth Amendment capital proportionality cases similarly seem to apply
heightened scrutiny. 49 Whereas Baze deferred to the state agency responsible
for lethal injection, proportionality cases like Kennedy more stringently
50
reviewed state legislative action.
To be sure, various factors can explain the Court's different approaches,
most notably differences between the Court's capital proportionality and
method-of-execution doctrines. 51 Nevertheless, the fact that the Court has
developed an Eighth Amendment doctrine that is consistently deferential to
administrative actors (in method-of-execution cases) but not deferential to
Whatever the
legislatures (in capital proportionality cases) is striking.
the Court's
result,
potential justifications for this seemingly counter-intuitive
failure to acknowledge, let alone justify, this discrepancy suggests a surprising
52
inattention to the differences between administrative and legislative action.
2.

Deference in Grutter v. Bollinger: Whither Bakke?

The Court also deferred to an administrative agency without ample
explanation in Grutter v. Bollinger.53 The petitioner, Barbara Grutter, was a

46 See infra Part I.A. L.a.

" See Berger, supra note 11, at 59-65 (discussing Baze's failure to consider problems
with state administration of lethal injection); Berger, supra note 41, at 283-86, 301-14
(discussing remedial concerns and political process failures in lethal injection).
18 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446-47 (2008); Berger, supra note 11, at 12-27
(comparing Baze with Kennedy).
49 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding unconstitutional the
death penalty for individuals who were minors when they committed their capital crime);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (finding unconstitutional the death penalty for
the mentally retarded).
50 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 444; Berger, supra note 11, at 3-4, 27-32.
51See Berger, supra note 11, at 27-37 (identifying factors explaining the discrepancy
between Baze and Kennedy).
52 See id. at 12-27.
" 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
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white Michigan resident who was denied admission to the University of
Michigan Law School. 54 Grutter argued "that her application was rejected
because the Law School uses race as a 'predominant' factor, giving applicants
who belong to certain minority groups 'a significantly greater chance of
admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial
groups."55
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor applied strict scrutiny because the
case involved race discrimination.5 6
Accordingly, the Law School's
admissions plan would only be constitutional if "narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests. '57 Despite this seemingly rigorous level of
scrutiny, the Court deferred to the Law School's judgment that diversity was a
compelling governmental interest and that the Law School's affirmative action
58
program was narrowly tailored to the achievement of that interest.
The Court, to its credit, did recognize that the governmental actor was not
the legislature but the Law School, emphasizing the Court's own "tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions."5 9 To this
extent, Grutter was more sensitive to the constitutional "who" than, say, Baze.
The Court also paid some attention to the constitutional "how," distinguishing
the Law School's more careful admissions procedures in Grutter with the less
individualized procedures used by the University of Michigan College of
60
Literature, Science, and the Arts in the companion case Gratz v. Bollinger.
That being said, the Court failed to address other important issues relevant
to the deference determination. For example, the Court did not adequately
address universities' roles within state politics at a more general level.
Admissions criteria generally - and the role of race in admissions decisions
more specifically - implicate important issues regarding education in our
democracy and the structure of social opportunity. 61 Despite the import of
these issues, Grutter failed to address adequately who was making these
decisions. Why should decisions so important to our democracy be left to a
law faculty and not considered by the full legislature? Had the legislature
delegated to the Law School faculty the authority to make this kind of

14

Id. at 316.

11 Id. at 317 (quoting the record).
56 See id at 326 (applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications, including affirmative
action). Interestingly, the four Justices joining Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion likely
would have each applied a less rigorous standard of review. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
StrictJudicialScrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1323 & n.313 (2007).
17 Grutter,539 U.S. at 326.
51 See id. at 328-43.
'9 Id. at 328.
60 See id. at 337 (comparing law school policy with undergraduate policy in Gratz);

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-76 (2003).
61 See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as PoliticalActs: Guardiansat the Gates of Our

DemocraticIdeals, 117 HARV. L. REv. 113, 143 (2003).
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judgment? Were the views of the state legislature or population relevant?
How much authority did the elected board of university regents enjoy over
such matters? 62 Did the law faculty use adequate and transparent procedures
when adopting the policy? Did Michigan's decision to operate an elite, highly
selective university affect the legitimacy of its decision also to employ raceconscious admissions policies?
These questions do not all yield easy answers, but given the ostensible
application of strict scrutiny, the Court's failure to consider them is notable.
Indeed, it is even more striking in light of Justice Powell's consideration of
such issues in Bakke. Powell emphasized that "isolated segments of our vast
governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions [about
affirmative action], at least in the absence of legislative mandates and
legislatively determined criteria." 63 Bakke, then, found the affirmative action
program problematic in substantial part because the medical school lacked
"authority and capability" to justify its racial classifications. 64 Bakke, in other
words, turned partially on the constitutional "who." Grutter's failure to
explore carefully the democratic pedigree and administrative procedures
underlying the challenged policy, then, is quite remarkable given that the
arguably most relevant precedent, Bakke, did precisely that.
3.

Deference in Korematsu v. UnitedStates and the Complication of Ex

ParteEndo
Korematsu v. United States65 is another famous case that ignored

administrative factors relevant to the deference afforded governmental
officials' decisions impinging individual rights. Fred Korematsu was
convicted under a federal statute making it a crime to disobey a military
commander with respect to entering or leaving a military zone. 66 Specifically,
Korematsu was convicted of violating General John L. DeWitt's order that all
Japanese Americans residing within certain "military zones" be relocated to
internment camps. 67 DeWitt had issued the directive pursuant to Executive
Order 9066, which authorized the military commander to exclude persons from
sensitive military areas. 68 As Charles Black argues, however, that order was
drafted in such general language that "no one reading [it] could have dreamt
[that a racial exclusion policy] was afoot. ' 69 Consequently, neither Congress
62

See MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (providing for elections of board of regents).

63 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978).
64

Id. at 309-10.

65 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
66

Id. at 215-16.

67

See Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).

68

Id.

69 BLACK,

supra note 33, at 81; see also PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 38, 48 (1983)

(discussing Executive Order 9066).
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or made a
nor the President affirmatively adopted the racial exclusion policy
70
stake.
at
question
constitutional
profound
the
on
determination
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, ostensibly applying heightened scrutiny,
deferred without examining the administrative procedures underlying General
DeWitt's determination. 7' Indeed, the majority opinion did not even mention
General DeWitt by name, thus ignoring the question of who had designed the
challenged policy.7 2 Instead, as in Baze, the Court treated the policy as though
it were the product of the political branches, stating that it was "unable to
and the Executive to
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress 73
Coast.
West
the
from
ancestry
Japanese
of
those
exclude
Justice Jackson identified this problem of the constitutional "who" in his
dissent:
[T]he "law" which this prisoner is convicted of disregarding is not found
in an act of Congress, but in a military order. Neither the Act of Congress
afford
nor the Executive Order of the President, nor both together, would 74
a basis for this conviction. It rests on the orders of General DeWitt.
Justice Jackson further addressed the constitutional "how," contending that the
Court had no "reasonable basis" for trusting DeWitt's assertions that the racial
exclusion was necessary, given that "[n]o evidence whatever on that subject
has been taken by this or any other court. '75 Whereas the Court blindly
accepted "General DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by
any cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable," 76 Justice Jackson
would have considered the government's epistemic authority on the relevant
question more carefully. 77 The Court, however, did not address these concerns
and, despite the racial discrimination at issue, failed to ask78whether General
DeWitt's political and epistemic authority merited deference.

70

See BLACK, supra note 33, at 81.

71See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (subjecting racial classifications to "the most rigid
scrutiny").
72 See id. at 215-24.

73Id. at 217. In fairness, the majority elsewhere referred to the policy as resulting from
the "judgment of the military authorities," id. at 218, but its analysis did not seem to
distinguish much between elected and unelected officials.
74Id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 228 (Roberts, J.,dissenting)
("General DeWitt instituted the curfew for certain areas within his command . .
75Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
76 Id.

71 See id.
78 More recent national security cases also apply a laxer review of administrative action.

See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (deferring to
the Secretary of State's determination that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations
further those organizations' terrorism without examining the thoroughness of her analysis);
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (deferring to the Solicitor General's
representations of State Department determinations without examining the procedures
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The unstudied deference in Korematsu is sometimes cited to emphasize the
Court's great deference to the military in times of war, but, on the very same
day it decided Korematsu, the Court also invalidated a related military
detention in Ex Parte Endo.79 Mitsuye Endo challenged her detention at the
Tule Lake War Relocation Center, where she was moved after being evacuated
from Sacramento, California pursuant to military orders. 80 The government
conceded that Endo was "a loyal and law-abiding citizen" but argued
nevertheless that "detention for an additional period after leave clearance has
81
been granted is an essential step in the evacuation program.
Whereas Korematsu deferred to the government, Endo held that the
appellant "should be given her liberty. '82 Admittedly, Endo's holding was on
statutory grounds, as the Court found that neither the relevant statutes nor
executive orders authorized detention of a loyal citizen. 83 However, as
Professor Gudridge persuasively argues, Endo's statutory interpretation hinged
substantially on constitutional norms. 84 Indeed, the Court emphasized the
Constitution's "procedural safeguards surrounding the arrest, detention and
conviction of individuals," including the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment,
and Suspension Clause. 85 In light of these constitutional concerns, the Court
refused to imply the power to detain from either the statute or executive
orders. 86 Thus, Endo's robust review of the detention contrasts sharply with
Korematsu's deferential treatment of the exclusion.
Korematsu and Endo's approaches to deference are difficult to square with
each other. Endo finds the detention invalid in large part because the relevant
administrative agency, the War Relocation Authority, had "no authority to
subject citizens who are concededly loyal. '87 Given the constitutional norms
at stake, the Court refused to imply such authorization to an administrative
agency. 88 This approach certainly fits with longstanding presumptions that
courts should interpret ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems and
that agency action closely skirting constitutional boundaries is disfavored
absent clear congressional authorization. 89 But given Endo's view that an

underlying those representations and determinations).
79323 U.S. 283, 308 (1944).
80
81

Id. at 284-85.

82

Id. at 297.

83

See id. at 300-01.

84

Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remembering Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1933, 1939 (2003)

Id.at 294-95.

("Endo is just as much a part of constitutional law as Korematsu is.").
85 Endo, 323 U.S. at 299.
86 Id. at 300.
87 Id. at 297.
Id. at 302-04.
See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); infra notes 173, 204-208 and accompanying text.
88

89
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administrative agency's authority to detain should be read stingily lest that
agency invade constitutional rights, it is strange that Korematsu would permit
an administrative official to institute a race-based exclusion that was also not
explicitly authorized by Congress. Indeed, Endo specifically noted that the
detention at issue was problematic precisely because it came from an agency
rather than "an Act of Congress or an order of the Chief Executive."9 In
contrast, Korematsu conflated an administrative official with Congress and the
President and then deferred to that official's policy burdening individual rights.
This discrepancy deserved explanation, but the Court offered little.
Deference in Prison Conditions Cases and Turner v. Safley's Internal
Tensions
The Court also often defers to administrative action in prison condition
cases without adequately considering the nature of the administrative decision
making. 9 1 This deference appears to be mostly unstudied. Though the Court
typically does acknowledge that the actor at issue is the prison (as opposed to
the state legislature), it usually does not look behind the challenged regulation
to see who has designed it or how it was adopted. Instead, as Professor Shay
argues, the Court usually treats prison regulations as "an undifferentiated
monolith, according them deference without asking how they are
formulated. '92 This unstudied approach to deference has been especially
prevalent since the 1980s, when the momentum of prison reform litigation
declined substantially. 93 Since then, the Court's prison conditions cases have
followed a deferential rational basis test. In Turner v. Safley, for instance, the
Court explained that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests." 94 Applying this test, the Court then upheld a
prison regulation prohibiting inmate-to-inmate correspondence. 95
4.

90

Endo, 323 U.S at 299-300.

91 See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-06 (1991)

(holding that an Eighth

Amendment violation arising from guard behavior during a prison riot required the guard to
act "maliciously and sadistically"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1981)
(holding that double celling inmates did not on its own violate the Eighth Amendment);
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 550, 622 (2006) ("Eighth Amendment law is extremely
limited: It exempts from constitutional analysis many of the issues that matter most to
prisoners."); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 339
(2009) ("Supreme Court case law defers to correction officials and their policies.").
92 Shay, supra note 91, at 339.
93 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS

several factors for the decline of momentum).
9"Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
9 Id. at 91.

46-47 (1998) (citing
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The Court justifies this deference by identifying the institutional concern
that "[r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of the
government. '96 Such institutional concerns, of course, appropriately guide
judicial deference in many cases. But while this explanation may justify some
decisions, it does not justify the Court's "one-size-fits-all approach. '97 Indeed,
the Court's blanket deference to the expertise of prison officials fails to
appreciate that many prisons lack qualified personnel or professional
standards. 98 Of course, different institutions sometimes need different policies,
but the Court's approach offers preemptive deference even to outlier policies
adopted by rogue guards ignoring professional standards.
The Court's
deference, in other words, is premised on institutional grounds without
sufficient examination of the actual institutional practices at issue.
The usual great deference in prison conditions cases is even harder to
explain in light of the Court's failure to explain adequately its occasionally
more rigorous approach. Turner itself reflects such inconsistencies. Whereas
the Court there deferred to the prison's correspondence regulation, it struck
down a second regulation prohibiting an inmate from marrying unless the
prison superintendent found "compelling reasons" to permit a marriage. 99 The
Court explained its approach in part by observing that marriage is a
fundamental right' 00 but opted not to resolve the case on those grounds.' 0 '
Instead, the Court concluded that the marriage regulation lacked "[c]ommon
sense" and was "not reasonably related" to the penological interests cited by
the prison. 10 2 The Turner Court, in fact, emphasized that the prison's
assessment of danger was "an exaggerated response to ... security
103
objectives."'
Turner, however, fails to explain why deference to the prison officials'
epistemic authority was appropriate for the correspondence but not the
marriage regulation. Nowhere, for instance, did the Court examine the prison

96

Id.at84-85.

97Shay, supra note 91, at 341.
98 See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN

AMERICA'S PRISONS 77-78 (2006), availableat
http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/ConfrontingConfinement.pdf
(discussing the
variability of prison rules and employee qualifications and the need for better oversight of
America's prisons).
99Turner,482 U.S. at 82.
"I Id. at 95.
101Id. at 97 ("[E]ven under the reasonable relationship test, the marriage regulation does
not withstand scrutiny.").
102 Id. at 97-98.
103 Id.
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officials' training or the administrative procedures used to adopt those
particular policies, even though deference to prison officials is surely more
deserving when those officials craft policies based on their genuine expertise
with security issues. Had the Court clearly applied heightened scrutiny
because a fundamental right was at issue, its analysis might have made sense,
but the Court's determination that the prison marriage policy was
unreasonable is hard to square with its explicitly deferential review of the
correspondence regulation. 104 Even within a single case, then, the Court
neglected inquiries that might have added much-needed rigor to its seemingly
contradictory deference determinations.
B.

HeightenedReview ofAgency Action

Though the Court often shortchanges administrative factors in individual
rights cases, those factors occasionally become the focal point of the
constitutional analysis. This attention to administrative law norms manifests
itself in different ways. Sometimes, as in Bakke and Endo, the Court expresses
concern that a policy emanated from an agency, rather than a more politically
accountable body.10 5 Sometimes it identifies the dangers that standardless
administrative discretion poses for individual rights. Sometimes it links the
scope of the constitutional right to procedural shortcomings injuring the
plaintiff. While the Court's consideration of these factors is inconsistent and
inchoate, its occasional reliance on them demonstrates that administrative law
norms are sometimes explicitly relevant to the deference those agents receive
10 6
in individual rights cases.
1.

Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong and the Fact and Nature of Administrative
Action

The plaintiffs in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 10 7 five Chinese legal resident
aliens, were qualified for available federal government jobs but were denied
employment because they were not United States citizens.108 They contended
that the Civil Service Commission regulations forbidding the employment of
legal resident aliens violated their equal protection and due process rights. 109
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the Court emphasized that it was "perfectly clear
that neither Congress nor the President has ever required the Civil Service
Commission to adopt the citizenship requirement as a condition of eligibility

104See id. at 99 (holding that the policy is "not reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives"); supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
10SSee supra Part I.A.2-3.
106 My focus here again is individual rights cases other than procedural due process

cases, which necessarily sometimes address administrative procedures.
107 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
108
Id. at 91-92.

109 Id. at 99-100.
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for employment in the federal civil service."' 110 Justice Stevens explained that
the outcome may very well have been different had Congress or the President
instituted the challenged policy, but an administrative agency like the Civil
Service Commission could not itself design policies raising such serious equal
protection concerns. 1 ' The Court therefore struck down the Commission's
2 indicating that it would review the employment rule more stringently
policy, 11
precisely because it came from an agency. 113
Mow Sun Wong also explored how the agency carried out its delegated
powers. The Court explained that "[t]he Civil Service Commission, like other
administrative agencies, has an obligation to perform its responsibilities with
some degree of expertise, and to make known the reasons for its important
decisions."'' 4
The Court was unimpressed with the Commission's
performance, stating that "[t]here is nothing in the record before us... to
indicate that the Commission actually made any considered evaluation of the
relative desirability of a simple exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value
to the service of enlarging the pool of eligible employees on the other."'" 15
Given that the Court usually reviews federal immigration laws
deferentially, 1 6 the administrative problems appear fatal to the challenged
policy in Mow Sun Wong. Indeed, the Court's analysis suggests that the
Commission had violated a core tenet of administrative law that agency
decisions "be based on a consideration of the relevant factors." 1 7 Although
the Court did not explicitly rely on administrative law or flesh out how those
norms interacted with the constitutional claims at issue, 1 8 administrative law
norms played a substantial role in the Court's constitutional reasoning." 9
110 Id. at 105.
11Id. at 104-05.

Id. at 116-17.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4,
48 (1996) (describing Mow Sun Wong as a case "expressly founded on the idea that publicly
accountable bodies should make the contested decision that was challenged").
114Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 115.
112
113

''5

Id.

See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976) (applying deferential review in
holding that Congress may condition an alien's eligibility for participation in Medicare on a
five-year continuous and permanent residence).
117Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see also
Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1417 (1978) (arguing that the
agency in Mow Sun Wong lacked the information, expertise, and discretion to enact its rule).
118 The Court did not seem to rest its holding on the argument that Congress has plenary
power over immigration, perhaps because congressional plenary power over immigration
has eroded over time as Congress has delegated some immigration policy to executive
officials. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Presidentand ImmigrationLaw,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 466 (2009).
119 Interestingly, Mow Sun Wong has never directly controlled subsequent Supreme
116
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First Amendment Licensing Cases and the Problem of Unbridled
Administrative Discretion

First Amendment licensing cases present another example of administrative
law norms factoring prominently into individual rights decisions. Perhaps
most famously, in Freedman v. Maryland,120 the Court struck down
Maryland's film censorship scheme, in part because the censorship board's
inadequate procedures created a significant possibility of delay and
discrimination against unpopular speech.' 2' The Court emphasized not just
free speech principles but also norms sounding in administrative law, stating
that the statute "delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an
1 22
administrative office."'
Freedman is one of several free speech licensing cases in which the Court
objected to an administrative scheme conferring too much discretion on an
official to curb speech. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,123 for
example, the Court invalidated an ordinance that conferred "virtually unbridled
and absolute power to prohibit any 'parade,' 'procession,' or 'demonstration'
on the city's streets or public ways."' 2 4 Cities, of course, can place reasonable
limitations on parades, but Birmingham's delegation gave too much
125
unconstrained discretion to officials to restrict speech.
In these cases, the Court focused on the governmental procedures used to
restrict speech. 126 Of course, the strong presumptions against prior restraints
and content-based discrimination figured heavily, but the inadequate
procedural safeguards heightened the agencies' ability to impose prior

Court decisions.

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 425-26 (4th ed. 2007).
120
121

380 U.S. 51 (1965).
See id. at 54-55.

Id. at 56.
394 U.S. 147 (1969).
24 Id. at 150 (footnote omitted).

122

123

125

See id.; see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757

(1988) ("[T]he mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled with the
power of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech .... ").
126 One might even read these cases to incorporate a due process requirement into the
Free Speech Clause. See Monaghan, supra note 33, at 518 ("[C]ourts have begun to
construct a body of procedural law which defines the manner in which they and other bodies
must evaluate and resolve first amendment claims - a first amendment 'due process'....").
To this extent, cases like Freedman and Shuttlesworth would differ from other cases
discussed already in that the lack of adequate procedures could not itself have amounted to a
constitutional violation in Mow Sun Wong (or Baze or Grutter), whereas it may have in the
First Amendment licensing cases. That said, the Court in all these cases neglected to offer a
thorough, systematic account of how administrative law norms affect the individual rights
analysis.
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restraints discriminating against disfavored content. 127 The Court did not
directly cite administrative law in reaching these conclusions, but the Court's
attempts to erect procedural safeguards and require that the censor explain his
reasoning mirror features of administrative law. 128
The administrative
shortcomings were problematic, then, precisely because they exacerbated the
129
potential for violation of substantive rights.
3.

Boumediene v. Bush and the Thoroughness of Administrative
Procedures

The Court also considered administrative law norms in fleshing out the
scope of the Suspension Clause in Boumediene v. Bush.130 Boumediene asked
whether Congress could constitutionally strip Guantanamo detainees of habeas
access to U.S. federal courts without formally suspending habeas corpus
pursuant to the Suspension Clause. 131 The question boiled down to whether
habeas extended to detainees held in American custody on a Guantanamo Bay
military base, over which the United States enjoyed de facto, but not de jure,
sovereignty.132 The Court held that non-citizens detained at Guantanamo were
constitutionally entitled to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus challenging
the legality of their detention. 133 Consequently, the Military Commissions
Act 134 violated the Suspension Clause when it stripped Guantanamo detainees
135
of this right.
Though much of the Court's opinion explored the history of habeas
corpus, 136 the Court also considered the procedural deficiencies plaguing the

127 See Monaghan, supra note 33, at 551 ("[F]irst amendment rights are fragile and can

be destroyed by insensitive procedures .... ").
128 See Metzger, supra note 24, at 487-88 (discussing the Court's approach to licensing
cases).
129 Interestingly, even as anomalous a case as Bush v. Gore may similarly reflect
concerns that inadequate procedural safeguards heighten the risk that government will treat
equally situated citizens differently. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106-09 (2000) (holding
that because "the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only
from county to county but indeed within a single county," voters were denied "the
rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness"); Tokaji, supra note
14, at 2487-95 (likening Bush v. Gore to speech licensing cases).
130 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
131See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
132 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
131 Id. at 771.
131 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635
(2006) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §2241(e) (Supp. 2007)).
13' Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792.
136 See id. at 740-46 (exploring habeas corpus's eighteenth century extraterritorial
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Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which the government had used
to classify detainees as enemy combatants who could be held indefinitely until
the cessation of hostilities. 37 In exploring the Suspension Clause's reach, the
Court emphasized that "the procedural protections afforded to the detainees...
[were very] limited, and... [thus fell] well short of the procedures and
adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus
review."' 38 The Court's analysis thus indicated that the constitutional question
regarding the extraterritorial reach of habeas depended, among other things, on
"the adequacy of the process through which [the detainee's] status
1 39
determination was made."
Consistent with administrative law principles, Boumediene also found that
the potential for appellate review of earlier proceedings could not itself wholly
cure defects in those earlier procedures. 40 Though the Court in many
individual rights cases involving agencies curiously ignores procedural due
process norms,' 4 1 Boumediene explicitly analogized to them, explaining that
"the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any
earlier proceedings."' 42 In Boumediene, "the sum total of procedural
protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and collateral"' 143 was
collectively inadequate, so the Court concluded that the existing procedures did
not offer sufficient procedural protections to warrant the withdrawal of
habeas. 144
One could argue that the adequacy of the CSRT procedures should only be
relevant ifthe detainees have a right to habeas at all. But the Court considered
the CSRT procedures not only to determine whether "Congress has provided
adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus"'' 45 but also ostensibly to help

application).
137 Even though some judges on the D.C. Circuit have treated CSRTs as "sui generis and
outside the contemplation of the APA," Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc), CSRTs also can be
thought of as a kind of agency. Cf Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1109 (2009) (remarking that certain judges in Bismullah did not
treat the CSRTs as agencies, "despite the breadth of the statutory definition").
138 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767.
' Id. at 766; see also Metzger, supra note 24, at 498 (arguing that Boumediene
"repeatedly suggested that use of more robust internal procedural protections could lead to a
different result").
140 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767 ("[A]lthough the detainee can seek review of his status
determination in the Court of Appeals, that review process cannot cure all defects in the
earlier proceedings.").
141See supra Part I.A.
142 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781.
143Id. at 783.
'44See id. at 783-92 (discussing CSRT procedures and the appellate court substitute).
'45 Id. at 771.
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determine whether the writ reached Guantanamo in the first place. Indeed, the
Court stated that "the outlines of a framework for determining the reach of the
Suspension Clause are suggested by" various factors, including the adequacy
of the procedure through which the status of the detainee was initially
determined. 46 Thus, inadequate governmental procedures heightened the
likelihood of a constitutional violation, even though the Court technically
reviewed not the propriety of those procedures but rather the statute limiting
147
habeas jurisdiction.
C.

The Significance of the DoctrinalDiscrepancy

The Court's decisions in these cases turn on multiple factors related to both
context and the constitutional right at issue. The Court, for instance, may have
been particularly suspicious of the government intrusion in the licensing cases
because of the special status of free speech and the strong presumption against
prior restraint.148 The Court also tends to defer more readily to governmental
institutions with ostensibly unique expertise and sensitive mandates, such as
prisons, especially when unsympathetic plaintiffs occupy the federal courts
with complaints against those institutions. 149 In other cases, the Court may
also be particularly wary of infringing on state entities due to federalism
concerns.
In addition, the Court likely considers itself more capable of curbing
excessive discretion in some areas than others. 50
The problems of
standardless discretion in the free speech licensing cases, for example, were
relatively easy to cure because courts simply could require administrative
officials to adopt specific rules for issuing licenses to speak. 151 By contrast, in
the prison conditions or lethal injection context, the Court may think it is more
difficult to craft an appropriate remedy mitigating an injustice.'

146

Id. at 766.

Other factors also figured into the scope of habeas corpus, including "the citizenship
and status of the detainee," "the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place," and "the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to
the writ." Id.
14" See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7-8 (1982)
117

(arguing that freedom of speech should receive special constitutional protection); KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118 (17th ed. 2010)
(summarizing Blackstone's view that free speech only protected against prior restraint).
149

See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (discussing

deference to prison officials); John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui Tam Action for

Perjury in a Civil Proceeding Is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Judicial
System, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 817 (2006) (discussing courts' concerns about numerous
prisoner suits clogging courts).
ISO See Tokaji, supra note 14, at 2465-66.
151 See id.
152

See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 297-335 (discussing remedial issues in prison
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These explanations help demonstrate that we should not be surprised that the
Court treats divergent topics very differently. Certain administrative factors
may have special constitutional resonance in particular cases. Moreover, many
of these are difficult cases pitting competing values against each other, so it is
perhaps inevitable that, taken as a whole, the Court's answers would seem
contradictory in some respects. But the point here is not that the Court should
have treated these cases more similarly - of course this wide range of cases
would trigger different analyses. Nor is the objective to defend or criticize the
outcome of these cases. Rather, the point is that the Court fails to provide an
adequate account of how the governmental agency's identity and behavior is
relevant to the Court's deference determination, even though the briefs
sometimes raise these issues and, as we have seen, the Court sometimes
suggests that these factors are relevant.1 53 The Court, in short, has failed to
develop a systematic approach in individual ights cases to questions regarding
15 4
agency identity and behavior.
The one place where the Court does approach official discretion in a fairly
consistent way is in the absolute immunity and qualified immunity contexts.
These cases, however, determine not whether an official has violated the
Constitution but rather whether the officials should be liable for money
damages when they violate such rights. The doctrines generally favor
55
governmental officials by offering them some protection from damages.
The deference afforded officials in these contexts, however, tells little about
the deference they deserve when courts determine the scope of the right in the
first instance and whether there has in fact been a constitutional violation.
The rest of this Article contends that the Court's individual rights doctrine
should take more consistent account of these issues by examining the context

litigation); Berger, supra note 41, at 280-301 (discussing how remedial concerns shape
lethal injection cases).
153 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 50, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (No. 07-5439)
(arguing that Kentucky's Department of Corrections utilized haphazard administrative
procedures in adopting its lethal injection protocol); Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan
Governor Jennifer M. Granholm at 13-14, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
02-241, 02-516) (arguing that the Michigan Constitution granted unique status to the
University of Michigan and that special deference to the university was therefore deserved);
Brief for Appellant at 16-19, 35-46, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No.
22) (arguing that neither Congress nor the President authorized General DeWitt's actions
and that the Court should therefore treat the General's actions less deferentially).
154 Of course, the Court may have good reasons for not theorizing these issues more
completely, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely TheorizedAgreements, 108 HARV.

L. REv. 1733 (1995), but the relationship between the administrative state and individual
rights still deserves more careful treatment.
155

See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (holding that under qualified

immunity doctrine governmental officials are liable only if they violate a "clearly
established" constitutional right); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-53 (1982) (holding

that the President is absolutely immune from suit for actions taken in his official capacity).
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and nature of agency action before deciding whether that action deserves
deference. The Court only sporadically accounted for this context in the cases
discussed above, and, even when it did, it usually failed to provide a rigorous,
consistent analysis. As we shall see, the approach proposed here might lead to
different results in certain cases, but even when it does not, it would help
courts provide more completely theorized analysis. Such an approach would,
then, encourage courts to confront complexity by embracing rather than

shunning contextual nuances.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

56

NORMS

IN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING

The NaturalIntersectionsof ConstitutionalLaw andAdministrative Law
Judges and scholars have largely been inattentive to the problem of
administrative discretion in individual rights cases. The Court could improve
its analysis simply by asking at the outset, as Professor Rosenkranz does,
"[Wiho has allegedly violated the Constitution?"'57 If the alleged violator is
an administrative agency, the Court should then ask how that agency conducts
its business. 158 The Court could then tailor the level of deference based on the
answers to those questions.
The "how" question is far more complicated, but courts could approach it by
turning to the kinds of factors that frequently guide ordinary administrative
law. 159 The APA, after all, is a "super-statute" entrenching governmental
structures and quasi-constitutional norms. 160 These norms are centrally
A.

156

See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a

Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 989 (1997) ("There are no simple rules for this
complex world. Rather, we must necessarily look to a plurality of institutions and practices
as contributors to an ongoing process of legitimizing the regulatory state.").
157 Rosenkranz, supra note 22, at 1290.
158 The "constitutional how" question may also be relevant in other cases, such as when
courts decide whether to defer to legislative fact-finding. See, e.g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-19 (2000) (refusing to defer to congressional findings linking
violence against women to interstate commerce). Nevertheless, given the democratic
pedigree of the legislature and chief executive, courts usually do not closely examine
legislative procedures, provided that the legislature has adhered to constitutionallyprescribed procedures for enacting legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring
bicameralism and presentment); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 119, at 409-46 (discussing due
process of lawmaking). For fascinating discussions of these issues arguing in favor of
enhanced judicial review of the legislative process, see generally Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The
Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915
(2011) and Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
159 Professor Metzger has persuasively argued the related point that the Court should
overtly identify the constitutional concerns underlying much ordinary administrative law.
See Metzger, supra note 24, at 534.
160 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 35, at 7-8 (discussing "superstatutes");
William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) ("A
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concerned with how to contain administrative discretion so that agencies
"appropriately balance the simultaneous demands of political responsiveness,
efficient administration, and respect for legal rights.' 161 Courts are familiar
with these inquiries from the APA and related doctrines, so they would not be
62
exploring uncharted territory.1
Moreover, many ordinary administrative law norms are themselves
constitutionally mandated or inspired and thus naturally connected to
constitutional inquiry. For example, administrative hearing requirements often
exist to satisfy procedural due process. 163 Such hearing requirements may be
controversial when a sub-constitutional, legislatively created "property" right
is at issue (e.g., an asserted property interest in continued employment), 164 but
where a constitutional liberty interest (e.g., speech) is at stake, the need for
administrative hearings should seem more pressing. Under this view,
administrative licensing requirements in cases like Freedman might be thought
65
of as a kind of constitutionally required due process to protect free speech.
Other administrative procedural requirements, such as the requirement that an
agency's action in a formal adjudication be made on the record after
166
opportunity for an agency hearing, also have roots in due process.

super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new normative or
institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time does 'stick' in the public culture
such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad
effect on the law - including an effect beyond the four comers of the statute.").
161 Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: FederalistFoundations,
1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1263-64 (2006).
162 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2006).
163 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-45 (1985)
(holding that due process requires that government provide a hearing before depriving
someone of life, liberty, or property); Bressman, supra note 24, at 468 (recognizing the
"possibility that the concern for arbitrariness, a staple of administrative law, actually
emanates from the constitutional structure"); Metzger, supra note 24, at 487 (observing that
administrative hearings "are often adopted to satisfy procedural due process's requirements
of notice and some opportunity to be heard").
164 See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538 (explaining that "property" interests in
continued employment are not created by the Constitution but are protected by due process
once they exist); Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process,
and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundationsof American Constitutionalism, 96
VA. L. REV. 1361, 1376 (2010) (describing as "controversial" the Court's inquiries into
"whether a statutorily created entitlement constitutes a 'property' interest" protected by
procedural due process).
165 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 24, at 487-88 (discussing First Amendment licensing
cases); Monaghan, supra note 33, at 522-24 (discussing Freedman's"preference for judicial
evaluation of [F]irst [A]mendment claims").
166 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), 554(c)(2), 556, 557; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385
(1908) (holding that Constitution imposes procedural due process requirements on
adjudications).
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But even where due process is less overtly implicated, procedural norms are
often protected in our legal system through various constitutionally inspired
For
(but not constitutionally required) administrative requirements. 67
instance, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm's famous
requirement that an "agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made,' 68 likely goes far beyond what
169
Congress intended when it enacted the Administrative Procedure Act.
170
Courts' "hard look" review
and corresponding expansive reading of the
APA, then, likely reflect courts' constitutional unease with broad delegations
71
of power to administrative agencies. '
The Court has also fashioned canons of interpretation reflecting
constitutional concerns about excessive agency power. It has not struck down
congressional delegations to agencies under the non-delegation doctrine since
the 1930s,172 but it protects these principles in more subtle ways, such as the
use of non-delegation canons disfavoring certain agency action without clear
congressional authorization. 173 Even if not constitutionally required, such
constraints are an important component of our constitutional checks and
balances, protecting against excessive agency authority and the arbitrary
agency action that sometimes accompanies such power. 174

167 See Metzger, supra note 24, at 490-97 (discussing constitutionally inspired ordinary
administrative law).
168 Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 See Metzger, supra note 24, at 490-91 ("'[A]rbitrary and capricious' review under
State Farm is a far cry from the lenient scrutiny originally intended by the Congress that
enacted the APA."); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1300-26 (1986) (describing the evolution of courts' "much closer
scrutiny of agency decisions" and the emergence of "hard look" review).
170 See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(arguing that the court's "supervisory function" calls on it to intervene if "the agency has
not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in
reasoned decision-making"), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
171Other administrative law and statutory interpretation doctrines can also be seen as
constitutionally inspired, such as Chevron's deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984), or clear statement rules, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61
(1991). See Metzger, supra note 24, at 505-06 (arguing that doctrines like Chevron are
constitutionally inspired though "the exact nature of their constitutional underpinnings
remains unspecified").
172 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (summarizing
history of non-delegation doctrine).
173See infra notes 202-209 and accompanying text.
174 See Bressman, supra note 24, at 468-70 ( "[Elarly models of administrative law were
premised on a constitutional theory that understood the aim of constitutional structure as the
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As Professor Metzger has demonstrated, some Justices have obliquely
acknowledged this connection between ordinary administrative law and
constitutional law. 175 In FCCv. Fox Television Stations, Inc., Justice Kennedy
observed that the administrative law requirements that agency policies not be
"arbitrary and capricious' ''stem from the administrative agency's unique
constitutional position."' 76 While the exact nature of this constitutional
position is "delicate, subtle, and complex,"'177 agencies are simultaneously too
important to abandon and too undemocratic to be given free rein. Thus,
agencies cannot be "permitted unbridled discretion [lest] their actions...
violate important constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks
and balances.' 78 Constitutional law, then, has significantly shaped the
contours of ordinary administrative law, adding bite to APA requirements and
inspiring various doctrines of statutory interpretation that impose heightened
obstacles for legislative delegations and resulting agency actions. 71 9
Constitutional law generally, and due process norms specifically, therefore
clearly plays a role in animating both some individual rights decisions (like
Freedman) and ordinary administrative law doctrine. But courts have not
systematically examined either due process doctrine or ordinary administrative
law to determine the procedures administrative officials must follow before
intruding on individual rights other than due process. Indeed, despite its farreaching consequences, the procedural due process inquiry is relatively limited
in scope, usually asking whether the plaintiff has an interest qualifying as "life,
liberty, or property," and if so, what process is due. 180 Thus, to explore more
fully how an agency has acted when allegedly violating a different (non-due
process) individual right, courts should look beyond due process doctrine to
ordinary administrative law concerns.
Phrased somewhat differently, the avenue between constitutional and
administrative law should not be a one-way street. Constitutional law clearly
has helped shape much administrative law. Now it is time to consider whether
those constitutionally inspired administrative law norms have resonance in
constitutional contexts, where they have been largely ignored. To be sure, the
Supreme Court has disparaged the judicial development of administrative rules

protection of individual liberty from arbitrary governmental intrusions.").
"' See Metzger, supra note 24, at 492-93.
176 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 For an excellent and more thorough discussion of this phenomenon, see Metzger,

supra note 24, at 486-512.
'10 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (formulating a test for
determining what process is due); JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMiNISTRATIVE
STATE 8-29 (1985) (exploring consequences of the due process "revolution").
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But courts have continued to impose
beyond APA requirements.' 8 1
rulemaking requirements exceeding APA specifications, 82 and, furthermore,
the proposal here pertains to constitutional cases where courts, whether they
admit it or not, already make ad hoc deference determinations. Administrative
law norms teach that agencies deserve less respect when they are
unaccountable, unknowledgeable, and procedurally erratic. Given that such
agencies usually would not receive deference in the administrative law context,
they should not be afforded blanket deference in constitutional individual
rights cases.
B.

Relevant Administrative Factors

Administrative law is extensive and involves numerous factors. As a result,
any list of administrative factors that may be relevant to constitutional decision
making will likely be both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. The purpose of
this discussion is not to etch in stone the particular administrative factors that
judges should consider when making deference determinations. Rather, it is to
provide examples of relevant inquiries that generally have been under-explored
183
in individual rights cases.
It is important to note that even if courts adopted my approach,
administrative law would still play a significant role in our system.
Administrative law, after all, is the primary legal vehicle through which the
legal system tries to shape agency action to improve social welfare and
increase political freedom. 84 But administrative law cannot always adequately
protect individual rights from arbitrary agency action, in part because
administrative law does not reach all administrative action. Certain important
administrative agencies and agents, such as police, prosecutors, prisons,
schools, universities, the CIA, and the military, frequently escape meaningful
administrative law review, either because they are explicitly exempted from
federal or state APAs or because the practical legal constraints on them are
extremely limited. 185 As a result, constitutional challenges may sometimes be

1"I See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 523-24 (1978) (holding that reviewing courts generally may not impose procedural
requirements on agency rulemaking beyond what § 553 of APA requires).
182 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of
JudicialReview andNuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 125, 160-67 (Peter L.
Strauss ed., 2006) (explaining that, despite Vermont Yankee, courts have continued to
scrutinize agency actions closely and adopt "expansive accounts" of § 553's "terse and
minimal" requirements).
183 See Adler, supra note 30, at 874 ("[T]he proper contours of judicial restraint cannot
be specified independently of the particular democratic, epistemic or other features of
administrative agencies ....
").
184 See STRAUSS ETAL., supra note 12, at 12-13.

'85 See Vermeule, supra note 137, at 1096 (arguing that administrative law contains a
series of "black holes" explicitly exempting agencies from administrative law and "grey
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the only means for an aggrieved individual to protect herself against an
overreaching agency.
The following discussion divides factors into three broad categories:
These
political accountability, expertise, and procedural regularity. 186
categories are doubtlessly interrelated, and some factors could be placed under
more than one heading. Agencies' structures and procedures also differ, 187 so
courts should not (and likely would not) approach the inquiries with a robotic
kind of checklist. Collectively, though, these factors should shape judicial
review of agencies' exercise of discretion in individual rights cases on a sliding
scale.
1.

Political Accountability

We begin with one of agencies' primary weaknesses: their lack of
democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy rests in substantial part on the
political accountability of governmental officials. 188 In the constitutional
context, much anxiety over judicial review stems from the recognition that
holes" which provide "constraints . . . so insubstantial that they pretty well permit
government to do as it pleases"); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (providing that
APA applies except to the extent that "statutes preclude review" or "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03 (West 2005)
(exempting University of Minnesota from Minnesota's APA); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5102(10)(G) (2005) (exempting from Tennessee's APA "statements concerning inmates of a
correctional or detention facility"); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
CriminalLaw, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989, 993 (2006) ("[U]nlike the administrative law context
...the government faces almost no institutional checks when it proceeds in criminal
matters."); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: PresidentialSpinoffs in
NationalSecurity Domains andBeyond, 97 VA. L. REv. 801, 885-87 (2011) (suggesting that
"legal and political black and grey holes might be expanding," especially when the
government contracts out responsibility to the private sector); Vermeule, supra note 137, at
1139 (explaining that military and foreign affairs actions are often exempt from the APA's
procedural requirements).
186 Though different administrative law issues arise in rulemakings and adjudications, my
discussion, for ease of presentation, considers these factors together.
187 This Article mostly does not distinguish between the different kinds of
"administrative agencies," such as cabinet departments, bureaus, independent agencies
within the executive branch, and independent regulatory commissions. See generally
STRAUSS, supra note 25, at 127-35 (discussing distinguishing features of these units).
Though there are important differences between these governmental bodies, they also share
much in common, including their public procedures. See id.at 134-35. I treat them
similarly here, but, to the extent there are sometimes meaningful differences, courts can
account for those differences in their analyses.
188 See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 17-19 ("[T]he policy-making power of representative
institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the
system."); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7778 (1980) (characterizing the process of subjecting representatives to popular election as the
"enforcement mechanism[]" used to guard against improperly wielded legislative power).
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"judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force," which allows unelected
judges to override policy decisions made by government officials who answer
to the people. 189 Consequently, judicial deference to governmental actors in
constitutional cases is often premised on the political branches' ostensible
political accountability. But if public officials are not accountable, judicial
deference to them rests on shakier ground. 190
It is therefore strange that courts sometimes defer to agencies in individual
rights cases without assessing their political authority. 191 Agencies usually are
not directly answerable to the people. Even though in theory they answer to
the politically accountable chief executive, 92 in practice some agencies are
largely unresponsive to public opinion. For example, while the existence of
lethal injection procedures in some states may reflect democratic support for
the death penalty, the particulars of those procedures are usually shrouded in
193
secrecy, beyond the contemplation of state legislators and the general public.
Such insulation may or may not be desirable, but the resulting procedures
clearly lack political accountability.
Administrative law is sometimes sensitive to agencies' potential
accountability deficit. 194 Nevertheless, courts in the constitutional context
usually ignore these concerns, assuming instead that agencies possess the

political authority that more directly elected political officials enjoy.

Such

conclusions may be theoretically justifiable. The "transmission belt" model of
the administrative state, for instance, posits that elected officials control the
discretion of administrative actors and that some degree of separation between
the people themselves and governmental actors is inevitable and unproblematic
in a republican government. 195 But courts do not explicitly embrace this
189 BICKEL, supra note

9, at 16.
190 Whether more genuine political authority is a satisfying rationale for deference is
another matter beyond the scope of this project.
191 Cf Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal PoliticalControl of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH.
L. REv. 53, 59 (2008) (summarizing the view that "bureaucratic policy should track
majoritarian values and that this goal is best advanced by giving decision-making authority
to the most politically accountable officials").
192 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 86566 (1984) ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is,and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices ....).
193 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 41, 301-14 (discussing lethal injection political process
failures); Denno, supra note 41, at 11 6-25 (discussing state delegation of lethal injection
protocols).
194 Administrative law, however, rarely openly embraces political justifications for
agency action. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 32-45 (2009) (arguing that political justifications
should have a more pronounced place in administrative law).
195 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 29, 1675-84 (discussing, but ultimately rejecting, a
theory of administrative law that "conceives of the agency as a mere transmission belt for
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theory, and most theorists agree that "the transmission belt model's invocation
of democratic control over administrative judgments [is] rather ragged and
19 6
worn."
Moreover, even if some constitutional decisions might be read as
implicitly embracing the transmission belt model, administrative law often
does not so casually assume the democratic legitimacy of all administrative
action. 197 We must then square constitutional law's sometimes reflexive
deference to political branch actors with administrative law's anxiety about
agencies' lack of political accountability.
a.

Legislative Guidance and Non-DelegationPrinciples

We can measure an agency's democratic accountability by considering
various factors, starting with legislative guidance to the agency. After all, the
unelected agency takes its marching orders from the elected legislature, so the
clarity and precision of those orders help determine the strength of the link
between politically accountable officials and agency action. 198 Consequently,
the whole legitimacy of delegation is premised on the legislature delegating
with a sufficiently "intelligible principle."' 199 By contrast, overly broad
delegation requires very little thought from elected officials, who can simply
tell an agency, "go take care of this." 200 As Professor Ely argued, legislatures
sometimes vaguely delegate matters to unaccountable lower-level officials
precisely because they seek to escape "the sort of accountability that is crucial
'20
to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic. '
Policies resulting from such vague delegations have less democratic
pedigree. Whereas more precise delegation gives the agency some policy
guidance from the legislature - and, through it, "the people" - vague
delegation essentially confers upon agencies a blank check. Such delegations
heighten the democratic deficit of administrative agencies, rendering them less
deserving of deference. 20 2

implementing legislative directives in particular cases").
196 MASHAW, supra note 180, at 18.
'9'See supra notes 163-180; infra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
198 See Rubin, supra note 32, at374 (characterizing modem legislation as instructions to
administrative agencies).
119Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,472 (2001).
200 See ELY, supra note 188, at 133 (stating that "policy direction" is what should be
required of legislatures); HENRY FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE
NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 21-22 (1962) ("[Elven if a statute telling an

agency 'Here is the problem: deal with it' be deemed to comply with the letter of [the
Constitution], it hardly does with the spirit.").
201 ELY, supra note 188, at 132.
202 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DuKE L.J. 2111, 2129 (2008) (arguing that
the Constitution vests decision-making authority in Congress rather than agencies); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 545-46 (2000)
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Significantly, the law already takes account of these norms. 203 While the
non-delegation doctrine is usually highly deferential to Congress with regard to
whether Congress may delegate authority, 20 4 the Court applies a more robust
variation of the doctrine in policing agency action pursuant to that delegation.
For instance, as mentioned above, the Court has fashioned several nondelegation canons, which limit agency authority to take certain actions without
express congressional authorization.
Consistent with the canon of
constitutional avoidance, 20 5 these non-delegation canons give narrow
20 6
constructions to statutory delegations raising constitutional concerns.
Accordingly, without clear legislative guidance, agencies cannot promulgate
retroactive rules, preempt state law, or create private causes of action, even
though Congress itself could pass statutes with those effects. 20 7 Additionally,
the Court sometimes asks whether agency action is consistent with the scope of
the agency's mandate, thus indicating that it will rein in agencies that exercise
authority beyond Congress's delegation. 20 8
The Court also gives less

(observing that despite agencies' considerable power, they are not "directly accountable to
the electorate").
203 See, e.g., Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 946-57 (2000)
(discussing doctrines promoting agency accountability).
204 See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 ("[I1n the history of the Court we have found
the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes .... ).
205See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)
(discussing different variations of the constitutional avoidance canon whereby courts
construe statutes to avoid serious constitutional concerns).
206 See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 496 (2011).
207 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (rejecting a preemption
claim in part "[b]ecause Congress has not authorized the FDA to pre-empt state law
directly"); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) ("[1]t is most certainly
incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that
has not been authorized by Congress."); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
208 (1988) ("[A] statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general
matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that
power is conveyed by Congress in express terms."); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) (discussing a "set of nondelegation canons,
which forbid executive agencies from making certain decisions on their own"); Ernest A.
Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1605-07 (2000) (discussing nondelegation canons as way to
enforce constitutional values).
208 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270-75 (2006) (striking down the Attorney
General's interpretive rule because it exceeded the scope of the statutory delegation); FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) ("[W]e are confident that
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion."); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30
(1958) (concluding that statutes did not clearly delegate to the Secretary of State the
authority to deny passports to alleged Communists).
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deference where the legislature has not granted the agency authority to pass
2
rules with the force of law. 09
Courts could engage in similar types of inquiries in individual rights cases
involving administrative agencies. More specifically, courts could explore
whether the legislature clearly gave the agency the authority to create legal
rules raising individual rights questions. 210 Agency action skirting close to
constitutional boundaries, under this view, would be more problematic when
the agency also skirts closer to the boundaries of its own authority and further
from the clear instructions of politically accountable bodies. 1
b.

Oversight

Once legislatures have delegated authority to agencies, some political
accountability can be maintained by proper oversight. Theories of the unitary
executive notwithstanding,21 2 many governmental departments are so large that
officials far down the chain of command - and far removed from the chief
executive's political appointments heading the department - wield significant
policymaking authority that can impact individual rights. 213 As a result, to
preserve political accountability, it is important to maintain a link not just
between the agency head and elected officials but also among the various
layers of administrative bureaucracy.
The structure of many agencies sometimes allows or even requires intraagency oversight, thus permitting review of a given official's decision by
agency personnel at various levels, including the agency head, agency
superiors, or even peers within the agency hierarchy. 214 Potential external
21 5
oversight can come from both the legislature and the chief executive.
209 See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001) (holding that Chevron
deference only applies where Congress intended to delegate force-of-law rulemaking
powers to agencies).
210 Of course, the legislature cannot constitutionally empower agencies to violate
individual rights, but it can delegate authority to take actions potentially implicating
constitutional concerns.
211 Of course, where the agency action is ultra vires, the agency's lack of authority will
settle the case, relieving the Court of the need to engage in a substantive constitutional
inquiry. Cf Oregon, 546 U.S. at 274-75 (denying Attorney General authority). Often,
however, the scope of delegated authority is muddy, necessitating further inquiry.
212 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI

& CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:

PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 8 (2008) (encouraging vigorous exercise

of presidential power over the rest of the executive branch).
213 See STRAUSS, supra note 25, at 130 (explaining that "the detailed understanding and
actual implementation" of many agency programs occurs "at some remove from the political
appointees").
214 DAVIS, supra note 13, at 142.

215 See STRAUSS, supra note 25, at 82-83 (discussing important role of congressional
committees overseeing agency functions); Watts, supra note 194, at 36-37 (summarizing
ways in which Congress can oversee agency policymaking, including holding hearings,
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Congressional committees oversee administrative agencies, a relationship both
Congress itself has also created the
sides usually take seriously. 2 6
Congressional Budget Office and the General Accountability Office to provide
professional oversight of administrative agencies. 2t 7
The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management
and Budget provides executive branch oversight, reviewing proposed
regulations and ensuring agency compliance with a president's larger policy
agenda.21 8 As for checks outside the political process, notice-and-comment
requirements allow for popular participation in - and, thus, observance of rulemaking procedures. 21 9 Oversight, then, is provided (albeit sometimes
220
indirectly) by various legal and social structures.
The norms animating these practices should also be relevant in individual
rights cases involving agencies. Where some politically accountable entity
maintains genuine oversight of agency actions, that agency action should have
greater presumptive political authority than when there is minimal oversight, as
is the case with some state agencies. 221 Similarly, when the relevant policy
emanates from far down the agency chain-of-command, courts should examine
whether agency superiors, including the legislative delegatee, have overseen
the challenged policy. 222 This attention to internal agency hierarchy would
help ensure accountability by requiring the agency head, who is sometimes
directly answerable to the chief executive, to take part in important
decisions. 223 While such attention to executive control over agencies has

responding to alarms sounded by constituents, controlling agencies' financial resources,
informally supervising agencies through various investigations, hearings, factfinding
missions, and informal contacts with agency staff).
216 STRAUSS,

supra note 25, at 83.

217 Id. at 85.
218

See Rachel

Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional

Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 31-37 (2010) (discussing oversight provided by OIRA).
219 See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 180, at 29-30.

221 One important exception would be some adjudications, where excessive political
oversight and control would violate prohibitions against ex parte contacts. STRAUSS, supra
note 25, at 273.
221 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Compensationfor Mass PrivateDelicts: Evolving Roles
ofAdministrative, Criminal,and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 977 n. 127 ("New York
state agencies enjoy less oversight than federal agencies.").
221 Cf David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup.
CT. REV. 201, 201-02 (2001) (arguing Chevron deference should hinge on whether statutory
delegatees make interpretive decisions themselves or delegate such decisions).
223 See id. at 237-40. Generally, agency heads are considered more politically
accountable when they are removable by the chief executive. Cf Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010) (invalidating dual for-cause
limitations on the President's authority to remove Board members).
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limitations, 24 it promotes political accountability by establishing a link
225
between the public and the bureaucracy.
c.

Transparency

Along similar lines, courts should consider the transparency of an agency's
Governmental
policy in assessing the agency's political authority.
accountability is premised on popular monitoring of governmental activities; if
the people cannot know what their government is doing, accountability is
severely compromised. 22 6 The risk of inadequate transparency is heightened in
the agency setting, where officials are usually unelected and where the layers
of bureaucracy and technical nature of the subject matter often shield a
department's affairs from public scrutiny. 227 Indeed, quite often the general
public has little idea what agencies actually do. 22 8 While this problem is
probably impossible to eliminate, transparency allows the people and
legislators to monitor agency action more carefully.
Various statutory requirements encourage administrative transparency. All
federal and many state agencies must announce their intent to adopt a new rule
in the Federal Register or state equivalent. 229 Under the Government in
Sunshine Act, the Federal Register must publish advance notice of the
independent regulatory commissions' meetings, which must be public. 230 Both
state and federal agencies usually are subject to Freedom of Information Act

224 See,

e.g., Bressman, supra note 24, at 503-15 (arguing that excessive attention to

presidential control shortchanges problems of agency arbitrariness).
225 See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2331-39
(2001) (arguing that presidential control model enhances agency accountability in various
ways); Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration,94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1994) (contending that greater presidential authority over the administrative
state will enhance accountability of agencies).
226 See ELY, supra note 188, at 125 ("[P]opular choice will mean relatively little if we
don't know what our representatives are up to."); Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation,
the Unitary Executive, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'V 103, 108 (2010) ("The essence of accountability lies in the transparency of
government actions ....).
227 See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1253,
1271 (2009) ("Not only are most voters unlikely to know or care about most administrative
decisions, but they will routinely have difficulty accurately gauging responsibility for those
decisions that subsequently prove unpopular.").
221 See Evan J. Criddle, FiduciaryAdministration: Rethinking PopularRepresentation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REv. 441, 448 (2010) ("[T]he American public generally
knows little about even those regulatory initiatives that most directly affect their interests.").
229 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) ("General notice of proposed rule making shall be
published in the Federal Register .. ");MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.201 (2007) (providing for
publication of "state agency rules, determinations, and other matters" in the Michigan
register).
230 See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
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requests requiring the disclosure of requested information. 231 And notice-andcomment rulemaking once again plays an important role, bringing the agency's
232
decision making process into public view.
Judicial review of agency action also contemplates that agency action
should be transparent. As Professor Bressman has explained, the reasoned
decision-making component of "hard look" review requires that an agency
"reveal the factual and legal basis for its decision.., in a common sense
format, one that is accessible not only to judges but to members of
Congress. '233 In so doing, "hard look" review serves a monitoring purpose,
minimizing
requiring "agencies to filter information for ordinary consumption,
234
informational asymmetries between administrator and legislator."
Given that transparency and sunshine are generally important in our
administrative structure, they should also be relevant to courts' deference
235
determinations in individual rights cases involving administrative agencies.
Secretive administrative practices deserve less presumptive deference than
transparent ones. As with many of the factors discussed here, transparency
exists on a continuum, and courts should therefore adjust the deference they
provide agencies based on where on that continuum the challenged policy falls.
Courts also should treat transparency, like the other factors, with common
sense and flexibility. Secrecy may be desirable and therefore more justifiable
in certain contexts, such as national security. 236 But absent a compelling

231 See id § 552 (providing for agencies to make information public unless an exception

applies); Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-231,
110 Stat. 3049; MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 2(a)(3)-(4) (1961) (requiring state
agencies to "make available for public inspection all rules and all other written statements of
policy" and making all orders, decisions, and opinions "available for public inspection").
232 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview
of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1449 (2005) ("[Nlotice-and-comment rulemaking

best ensures the transparency, deliberation, and consistency that produce fair and reasonable
laws."); Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 415 (2009) (arguing that APA's notice-and-comment

requirements "work to democratize agencies by increasing public involvement in the
rulemaking process").
233 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1777, 1780 (2007).
234

Id.

235 See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The FederalBudget Process and
the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 871, 924-25 (1999) (discussing the connection

between transparency and accountability); Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy,
57 STAN. L. REV. 737, 756 (2004) (arguing that transparency is a "predicate for
accountability").
236 It is no accident, for instance, that the "CIA is as free from administrative law
constraints as a government agency can be." Michaels, supra note 185, at 806. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to explore these concerns more thoroughly.
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governmental interest in secrecy, courts should review more skeptically
policies designed behind closed doors.
d.

The Problem of Elected Administrative Agents

One factor complicating the political-authority inquiry is that some state and
local administrative officials, such as attorneys general, treasurers, and regents
for public universities, are themselves elected to office 2 37 and therefore enjoy
political legitimacy that many other administrative agents do not. When
actions taken by these elected agents are at issue, some of the politicalaccountability considerations are less pressing. Legislative oversight, for
instance, seems less necessary when the people themselves elect the
responsible agent. 238 Even elected officials' democratic legitimacy, however,
should not be taken entirely for granted. State administrative officials are
typically elected to perform a particular job, and if certain actions exceed that
mandate, the democratic legitimacy for those actions weakens. Relatedly, true
accountability requires some degree of transparency. Agents operating in
secret cannot really claim to answer to the people. To this extent, elected state
administrative agents presumably will score better than unelected agents on
political accountability - but not necessarily.
2. Expertise
Whereas inquiries into political authority explore a weakness of
administrative agencies, exploration of expertise gets at agencies' primary
strength: their epistemic command of particular policy issues. Administrative
agencies exist in large part to approach complicated problems with a
specialized expertise that the legislature lacks. 239 Agencies' structure and
personnel reflect the significance of their purported expertise; most agencies
have a small, politically-appointed leadership and a large, professional, expert
staff.240 Expertise, then, is central to agencies' identity and raison d'Otre. As
Professor Zipkin puts it, "[W]hy... allow agency action at all unless the
agency is doing something that the legislature could not do itself?".' 24 1
237 See, e.g., Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1385, 1399-1400 (2008) (explaining that most state and local governments
provide for elections of many executive officials, including forty-three states who elect their
attorneys general and thirty-eight states who elect their treasurers).
238 Cf id. at 1394 (discussing the virtues of an "unbundled executive" in which executive
officials elected to perform just one duty are more "electorally accountable than a single
executive").
239 See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 180, at 19 (explaining that much of the impetus for the
creation of administrative agencies is the desire for expert rather than lay or political
judgment).
240 See STRAUSS, supra note 25, at 135 (describing agency staffs as "professional rather
than political in character").
241 Saul Zipkin, Administering Election Law, 95 MARQ. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012)
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Accordingly, deference to agency action in both the administrative and
constitutional contexts is premised in substantial part on the agency's
epistemic authority and its careful exercise of that authority. 242 But agencies
sometimes lack expertise over matters before them or do not make use of the
expertise they have. More careful inquiry into agency expertise is therefore
needed.
a.

Epistemic Authority

In deferring to the government in constitutional cases, courts often cite the
government's superior epistemic authority, regardless of who within
government is acting. Courts often assume that the political branches
necessarily possess superior information, skills, and experience to evaluate
relevant factual evidence and assess the given problem. 243 This assumption is
244
often correct when agencies act - but not always.
Verification of agencies' epistemic authority is essential to the proper
functioning of the administrative state. The Supreme Court itself has stated
that an administrative agency has "an obligation to perform its responsibilities
with some degree of expertise. '245 Courts do not always verify epistemic
authority, but their general focus on technocratic competence in administrative
246
law cases demonstrates a commitment to expert-based decision making.
"Arbitrary and capricious" review, in particular, is often a means for courts to
247
examine whether the agency made its decision with sufficient expertise.
Courts engaging in such review, then, consistently search "agency decisions to
ensure they represent expert-driven, technocratic decisionmaking. ' '248 Absent
this expertise, agencies sometimes have no more facility with the facts than
courts. Indeed, to the extent courts frequently deal with facts outside their area

(manuscript at 30) (on file with author).
242 See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 1078.
243 See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, JudicialReview, and the Bill
ofRights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1003-09 (1999).
244 See Kagan, supra note 225, at 2354 ("[N]ot all agency action entails the application of
expertise, even when the action properly should do so.").
245 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115 (1975).
246 See Watts, supra note 194, at 15-29 (discussing the judiciary's search for agencies'
technocratic expertise).
247 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E)-(F) (2006) (allowing courts to set aside agency action
unsupported by substantial evidence or unwarranted by facts); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (discussing judicial inquiry of
agency action); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 419-21 (2007)
(justifying deference on the basis of the agency's technical expertise).
248 Watts, supra note 194, at 19.
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complicated
of expertise, they may be better than agencies at understanding
249
areas to which they previously have been unexposed.

Interestingly, epistemic shortcomings are not wholly disconnected from
Delegation without expertise lacks the implicit
democratic failings.
other delegations enjoy; in an era of a pervasive
that
democratic support
general public assumes that legislatures should
state,
the
administrative
delegate to experts. 250 Thus, as Professor Mashaw states, "Administrative
that
legitimacy flows primarily from a belief in the specialized knowledge 251
choices.
policy
critical
on
bear
to
bring
can
decisionmakers
administrative
Attention to epistemic authority could also help courts distinguish more
consistently between an agency's factual determinations and its application of
law to fact. Courts often give agencies deference in both contexts, 252 but it is
not clear that they should. Where a court confirms that an agency has genuine
epistemic authority, deference to the agency's factual determinations makes
sense. However, when constitutional questions are at issue, deference to
agency application of law to fact seems less appropriate. After all, unlike the
Chevron context, in which Congress delegates authority to agencies to interpret
the statutes they administer, agencies possess no special competency or
authority over constitutional questions.2 53 Accordingly, agencies should
receive more deference when they utilize their expertise to make factual
findings (e.g., racial diversity improves educational experiences) than when
they apply law to facts (e.g., using race as a plus-factor in admissions is
sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny). Greater judicial
attention to agencies' epistemic authority could help courts be more sensitive
to these distinctions.
b.

Thoroughness

Epistemic authority has little value if it is not put to good use. Agencies,
therefore, must generally show not just that they understand the topic but that
they have considered all the evidence from a variety of angles. This attention

249

Cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that the

trial judge's role as a "gatekeep[er]" of expert testimony is to ensure that the claimed basis
for scientific testimony is valid).
250 See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 400-01 (2002)
("[C]itizens often expect government officials to act based on superior, expert knowledge
....
.).
251 Jerry Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States,
and the Projectof DemocraticGovernance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 117 (2007).
252 See, e.g., NVE Inc. v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 182 (3d Cir.
2006) (holding that the FDA's factual determinations and applications of law were both
entitled to deference); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

463 (1993) ("[C]ourts generally defer to the result reached by the agency when it applies...
law to the facts before it.").
253 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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to thoroughness is a hallmark of administrative law. Indeed, "arbitrary and
capricious" review often asks if agencies have made their decisions "based on
a consideration of the relevant factors. '254 As the Court explained in State
Farm:
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made. In reviewing that explanation, we must
consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
55
view or the product of agency expertise.
This inquiry, of course, characterizes "hard look" review, under which courts
As Judge
scrutinize carefully the procedure behind agency decisions.
Leventhal described, "The function of the court is to assure that the agency has
256
given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues."
Once again, these common staples of administrative law are relevant to
constitutional decision making. To be sure, courts should not deem agency
action unconstitutional merely because the agency could have analyzed the
relevant facts with more care.
But courts should also not defer to
administrative agencies in individual rights cases on account of their epistemic
authority without checking whether they made use of that expertise.
3.

Arbitrariness, Procedural Regularity, and the Rule of Law

Arbitrariness also is a significant judicial concern when administrative
agencies exercise power.257 The term "arbitrary" is familiar in administrative
law because of the APA's provision instructing courts to "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be... arbitrary
[and] capricious. '258 The term is rarely defined with precision, 259 but
arbitrariness often encompasses a failure to adhere to standard administrative

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254

255

256 Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

257 See Bressman, supra note 24, at 462-63 (arguing that administrative law scholars
should focus more on problems of arbitrariness).
258 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
259

See R.George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in Administrative

Law Can't Be Defined, and What This Means for the Law in General, 44 U. RICH. L. REv.
839, 839 (2010) ("What arbitrariness means ...is surprisingly elusive.").
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procedures.2 60 This section addresses this facet of arbitrariness - a concern
that agencies adhere to the rule of law by following well-established
261
procedures.
Agency arbitrariness can be dangerous not just because it results in bad
262
policy but also because it enables agencies to intrude on individual rights.
By creating administrative agencies - and thus disrupting the original
constitutional structure of government - Congress increased the potential for
Relatively formalized
governmental intrusion in individual rights. 263
procedures and clear explanations of agency action serve to check vast
administrative discretion and make it more difficult for agencies to encroach
on liberties. A politically accountable, expert agency still does not deserve
complete deference if its institutional practices are shoddy and it capriciously
takes actions that impinge on individual rights without following commonly
accepted procedures. 264 The administrative law norms considered here, then,
derive from "a constitutional theory that understood the aim of constitutional
structure as the protection of individual liberty from arbitrary governmental
265
intrusions."
a.

FormalizedProcedures

One method of checking agency arbitrariness is to consider whether an
agency, acting either by rulemaking or adjudication, utilized commonly
accepted, formalized procedures. Such an inquiry is particularly straight
forward in the rulemaking context, where notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures are the norm.2 66 Though notice-and-comment rulemaking cannot
guarantee the resulting policy's constitutionality, it tends to further both

260 In focusing on such procedural, rule-of-law considerations, I do not suggest that
"arbitrariness" may not also be defined to encompass other issues.
261Given this definition, problems of arbitrariness may be more likely to arise in agency
adjudications, since agency rulemakings frequently follow notice-and-comment procedures,
which force agencies to abide by certain procedures, respond to comments from outsiders,
and explain their decisions. That said, the lethal injection procedure and affirmative action
plan discussed above seem to be rules developed outside typical rulemaking procedures.
262 Stewart, supra note 29, at 1680 (discussing checks on agencies that "promote formal
justice in order to protect private autonomy").
263 Bressman, supra note 24, at 467.
264 To be clear, the agency action may still be constitutional if there is no violation of a
substantive constitutional right, but the procedural shortcomings should somewhat diminish
the deference courts owe the agency on institutional grounds. See id.; infra Part II.C. 1.
265
266

Bressman, supra note 24, at 470.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is actually categorized by the APA as "informal

rulemaking," but its procedures are nonetheless relatively formalized. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(2006); RICHARD J.

(distinguishing

PIERCE,

between

JR.,

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW AND PROCESS

"informal" notice-and-comment

rulemaking, which includes adjudicatory procedures).

327 (2009)

rulemaking and "formal"
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accountability and the rule of law by inviting interested parties to participate in
267
the rulemaking process.

The Supreme Court has recognized that agencies deserve greater deference
268
when employing formalized procedures. As United States v. Mead
observed, policies resulting from such formalized procedures tend "to foster
the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement" 269 with
force of law and therefore help reinforce rule-of-law values. Mead reasoned
that more formalized procedures help produce greater predictability and
discipline in agency decision making and are therefore more deserving of
270
Chevron deference.
In light of these principles, agencies should receive less deference in the
individual rights context when they operate outside commonly accepted
procedures. Of course, there are a wide range of acceptable procedures, 271 and
some less formal procedures may still be sufficient to deserve deference in
some contexts. 272 But administrative injustice probably most frequently occurs
where few formalized procedural requirements constrain administrative
discretion. 273 Indeed, because agency decisions outside normal procedures
often escape extra-agency oversight and the ambit of the APA, challenges to
such policies' constitutionality may be the only time a competent
governmental official will review the legality of the policy. 274 Such judicial
275 Of
review is therefore essential to a properly functioning democracy.
course, procedurally suspect agency action may still sometimes pass
constitutional muster; a regulation may be sloppily adopted without infringing
upon any individual right. But courts should not blindly equate agency action
267 See Bressman, supra note 24, at 541-42 ("Notice-and-comment rulemaking, by its

nature, facilitates the participation of affected parties, the submission of relevant
information, and the prospective application of resulting policy."); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justificationfor the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992)
(arguing that a model of civic republicanism provides an essential justification for the
bureaucratic state because of the opportunities it provides for citizen participation in
government).
268
269

533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 230.

270 See id.; Barron & Kagan, supra note 222, at 225-26 (explaining how Mead rewards

more formal decision making).
271 Bressman, supra note 24, at 541.
272 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL.,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY

POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 494 (6th ed. 2006) (commenting that informal

adjudications have no particular procedural requirements).
273 DAVIS, supra note 13, at v.

274 See id at vi (stating that 80-90% of informal agency actions escape judicial review).
275 See Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrarinessand Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 57 & n.1 1 (1965) (quoting Justice Jackson as stating that "[t]o stand between the
individual and arbitrary action by the Government is the highest function of [the Supreme]
Court").
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that complies with accepted formalized procedures with agency action that
does not.
b.

ReasonedExplanation

Administrative law also helps reinforce the rule of law by requiring agencies
to give reasoned explanations for their actions. 276 This requirement serves
interrelated goals. First, it facilitates judicial review of agency action by
making clear precisely what the agency did and why. Second, the prospect of
judicial review provides incentives for agencies to act carefully to avoid the
"arbitrary and capricious" label. 277 Third, the process of articulating a
rationale itself can independently force officials to think through their actions
more carefully, independent of the incentives provided by an external judicial

check. 278 Fourth, the requirement helps reinforce political controls by
educating the legislature, chief executive, and general public of the agency's

actions. 279 Fifth, because "an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the
grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon
which its actions can be sustained, ' 280 agencies must justify their actions in
terms of the initial statutory delegation, thus reinforcing their own democratic
legitimacy. 281 Finally, a reasoned explanation requirement can also help courts
determine whether an agency has taken proper account of constitutional
norms. 28 2 Where the agency apparently has failed to consider constitutional
norms, presumptive judicial deference in a constitutional case would be

inappropriate.

283

276 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) ("[An] agency must... articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action ....
").
277 See Todd S. Aagaard, FactualPremises of Statutory Interpretationin Agency Review
Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 366, 402 (2009) (explaining that agencies are cognizant that
the prospect of judicial review looms over agency rulemaking decisions).
278 See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 508-22 (2002) (describing accountability and
other factors as enhancing the caliber of agency decision making); Glen Staszewski,
Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct
Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 443 (2003) ("The net result of APA procedures and hard
look judicial review under State Farm is to encourage and enforce republican ideals of
deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the administrative lawmaking process."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
279 See Metzger, supra note 24, at 492.
280 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,95 (1943).
281 See Kevin M. Stack, The ConstitutionalFoundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,

958 (2007).
282 See Bressman, supra note 24, at 474 (arguing that courts should and do prod
"agencies to exercise their judgments in ways that recognized and safeguarded individual
rights").
283 Because agencies lack any special competence to interpret the Constitution, courts
should not defer excessively to an agency's constitutional judgments, even where the
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Once again, this factor should also be relevant in constitutional cases.
Where agencies threaten individual rights and are unable to provide a cogent
explanation of their actions, courts should be stingier in affording deference.
Of course, the extent to which courts expect a thorough explanation may
depend on the nature of the issue and agency. Some factors, such as national
security, might sometimes militate for less complete public explanations. In
other words, like the other factors discussed here, courts should apply this
factor with flexibility and common sense, but agencies generally deserve less
deference when they fail to explain clearly what they have done and why.
In sum, the factors discussed here are not exclusive, and some may prove
less relevant in certain cases. Collectively, though, they help provide a sense
of whether an agency deserves the broad discretion that results from judicial
deference.
C.

The Factors'Place in the ConstitutionalAnalysis
1.

Administrative Law Norms in Deference Determinations

Having laid out the factors courts should consider, I now explain more
precisely those factors' role in the constitutional analysis. Administrative
factors under my theory speak primarily to the deference owed to
governmental agencies due to institutional concerns. The factors thus inform
judicial restraint based on concerns about courts' institutional role relative to
the other relevant governmental actors, as opposed to restraint informed by
substantive constitutional issues (e.g., race discrimination). 28 4 This deference
determination is complicated by the fact that it is often conducted in
conjunction with a level of scrutiny (i.e., rational basis, intermediate scrutiny,
or strict scrutiny), which is triggered by substantive doctrinal factors. In other
words, when courts determine how rigorously to review a governmental
policy, they (often silently) select a level of deference based on institutional
concerns and (usually more explicitly) sometimes also apply a level of scrutiny
triggered by the substantive constitutional issue.
Given that deference rests on institutional concerns, courts should actually
examine the institutions at issue before making such determinations. Under
my theory, courts would use the administrative law factors to examine the
agency.28 5 The degree of deference would lie on a sliding scale, hinging on the
agency's compliance with the factors discussed here.
Of course, such
agency has considered constitutional norms.
284 See Adler, supra note 30, at 773-74 (distinguishing between an "analytic" argument

for upholding an anti-abortion law, such as the fetus's moral right to life, and an
"institutional" argument for upholding such a law, such as legislatures' epistemic
superiority).
285 Litigants under this theory would also likely call more attention to agency behavior.
While this new attention might increase discovery costs somewhat, it would also shine
valuable light on some agencies' internal operations.
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determinations should not be made mechanically without reference to context,
but, in general, the greater the agency's compliance, the more deference the
286
agency deserves.
Once the Court determines the degree of deference, it should then use that
level of deference as a lens through which to conduct the substantive doctrinal
inquiry. This lens may influence the Court's view of the importance of the
governmental interest, the necessity of the challenged policy to the
achievement of that interest, and, more generally, the overall strength of the
government's case. For example, in an intermediate scrutiny case, the
administrative factors would help determine how readily the Court should
defer to the agency's assertion that a particular interest was important and that
the challenged policy was sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.
The deference determination, then, will never be the sole constitutional
inquiry. It should help courts - especially lower courts, which do most of our
agency-monitoring 287 - determine their willingness to grant the government
discretion, but it will not by itself dictate the outcome. Laudable democratic
pedigree would not save the constitutionality of racial segregation, 288 and
atrocious adherence to administrative law norms, similarly, would not render
unconstitutional an execution procedure posing no risk of pain. 289 That being
said, the deference determination should help shape the way courts engage in
the substantive inquiry, either by determining how the level of scrutiny 29is0
applied or by creating a general presumption for or against the government.

286 Cf

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:

Supreme Court Treatment ofAgency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1181 (2008) (providing a roadmap for deference to agencies in

administrative law cases based on the outcome of multiple inquiries).
Id. at 1183.
288 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding unconstitutional an anti287

miscegenation statute).
289 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008) (plurality opinion) (requiring a "substantial
risk of severe" pain for an Eighth Amendment violation).
290 A potential alternative to protect some of the values discussed here would be through
non-delegation canons, under which the relevant statute would be interpreted so as not to
delegate authority to agencies to take the challenged actions. See supra notes 172-174, 204208 and accompanying text. However, many of the cases discussed here are brought as
constitutionalchallenges, not challenges to the scope of an agency's authority. Moreover,
non-delegation canons would likely be most relevant where the administrative shortcoming
involved the scope of the delegation. Presumably, it would be more difficult - and less
appropriate - to invoke a non-delegation canon where the statutory delegation was clear but
the agency allegedly infringing on individual rights acted without expertise or standard
procedures. Of course, if the agency did lack the delegated authority to take the action in
question, the action would be invalid, and the constitutional question would be moot. See
supra note 211.
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Thus, even though the deference determination should not be the sole
291
constitutional inquiry, in some cases it may significantly affect the outcome.
Of course, a criticism of my approach is that deference is notoriously
difficult to calibrate appropriately. Many critics, for instance, question
whether Chevron in practice actually invites a range of approaches only
loosely tethered to the Supreme Court's formulation. 292 Recent empirical and
political science scholarship further argues that judges in administrative law
cases are often guided not by the rule of law but rather by their ideological
preferences, suggesting that the factors I identify play less of a role than judges
and some law professors would like to think. 293 From this perspective, my
proposal may do little to add clarity and rigor to judicial deference
determinations.
These concerns are legitimate, but, whatever their institutional limitations,

294
courts make deference determinations in constitutional cases anyway.

Attention to the norms examined here will likely make those determinations
more careful, principled, and nuanced. There likely will be some abuses and
inconsistencies, as there always may be when courts apply multi-factor tests.
On the whole, though, judicial attention to these factors should be an
improvement over courts' current haphazard, ad hoc approach.
In addition to improving the status quo, my approach is also preferable to
more extreme alternatives. One such extreme would be always to defer to the
agency in constitutional cases. Doing so, however, would effectively cede
constitutional meaning to administrative officials. Given that these officials
enjoy neither the expertise nor the mandate to determine constitutional
meaning, this result would be untenable. 295 Another extreme - independent
judicial review of all agency action - would be unsettling insofar as it strays
far from current practices in which courts usually do afford agencies some
291 See Solove, supra note 243, at 953 ("The practice of deference has drastic effects on
the outcomes of cases ....
").
292 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE

L.J. 676, 679 (2007) ("Doctrinally, there are many ambiguities and uncertainties about the
nature of the inquiry at the first and second steps of Chevron ....");David Zaring,
Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010) (arguing that outcomes in
administrative law cases do not turn on Chevron or the other rules as articulated by courts).
293 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 7-12 (2002) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices often

vote in accordance with their preferred policy outcomes); Gersen & Vermeule, supra note
292, at 679 ("[R]ecent evidence suggests that Chevron's effect varies markedly with the
ideological and political preferences of the judges who apply it."); Thomas J. Miles & Cass
R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron,
73 U. CHL L. REV. 823, 825-26 (2006); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Chevron as Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in
Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1784 (2010).
294 See supra Part I.
295 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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measure of deference. Moreover, given that some agencies do enjoy genuine
political and epistemic authority, independent judicial review may intrude too
much on agencies' policymaking prerogative. While courts certainly should
not cede the meaning of the Constitution to administrative agencies, they also
must recognize their own institutional limitations relative to those agencies.
Ultimately, a more nuanced middle ground is preferable. Even if deference
is impossible to calibrate perfectly, courts can greatly improve their current
practices by focusing on the factors identified here, which speak directly to
whether the agency has acted in a manner deserving respect. Furthermore, the
very process of engaging in these inquiries can help courts recognize and steer
away from their ideological leanings, thus improving their own institutional
legitimacy. Judges might often vote in accordance with their own normative
leanings, but probably most of them sincerely believe themselves to be
following the rule of law. 296 To this extent, inquiries that focus judges'
deference determinations on certain factors may actually help mitigate the role
297
of ideology in their decisions.
2.

Applications to State Agency Policies

This analysis should apply to deference determinations in cases involving
both federal and state agency action. It is admittedly more controversial to
apply my theory to state administrative action. States are not bound by either
federal separation-of-powers doctrine or the federal Administrative Procedure
Act, and federal courts since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 298 usually do not
look to see how state law was created.2 99 There are therefore reasons to think
that federalism principles might militate for different approaches where state
agency action is at issue. Nevertheless, while federal courts could not rule that
a state agency lacked the requisite authority under state law to take particular
action,300 they should still be able to consider administrative law factors in
determining the deference due to a state agency subject to federal
constitutional challenge.

296 See, e.g., Raso & Eskridge, supra note 293, at 1797 (believing the Justices'
differences of opinion regarding Chevron's domain to be "sincere").
297 See infra Part III.B.
298 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
299 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[I]n

ordinary cases, the distribution of powers among the branches of a State's government raises
no questions of federal constitutional law."); Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F. Supp. 1274, 1277 (D.
Kan. 1979) ("How power shall be distributed among its governmental organs is commonly,
if not always, a question for the state itself").
30 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) ("[lIt is
difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court
instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.").
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Significantly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies
most protections of the Bill of Rights against the states. 30 1 The power of
federal courts to invalidate state laws burdening many federal constitutional
rights, then, cannot seriously be questioned. It would therefore be strange for
federalism principles to forbid judicial examination of how states erected
policies allegedly infringing on those rights, especially when those state
practices themselves threaten them. Indeed, due process principles should
allow federal courts to examine procedures increasing the likelihood that state
agents will violate individual rights, even though they could not invalidate the
delegation to those state agents. 30 2 The free speech licensing cases followed
this reasoning, recognizing that judicial examination of how state or municipal
agencies operated was essential because inadequate administrative procedures
exacerbated the risk of constitutional violation. 30 3 As Professor Monaghan
explains, to protect constitutional rights, "courts must thoroughly evaluate
' '3°4
every aspect of the procedural system which protects those rights.
Indeed, far from being irrelevant to state administrative action, my theory
should resonate especially strongly there. Though many states borrowed from
the federal APA in designing their own administrative law systems, 30 5 state
administrative law sometimes lacks the rigor and formality of the federal
APA. 30 6 Moreover, state administrative law sometimes exempts important
agencies from its ambit. 30 7 Consequently, some state agencies escape
meaningful oversight - sometimes by design, sometimes by accident. While
procedural shortcomings are not unconstitutional by themselves, agencies may

301

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010).

302 Cf Berger, supra note 275, at 88-89 (arguing that judicial review to insure protection

against official action is a "matter of right" stemming from "1) the implications of the
delegation of powers; 2) due process; and 3) the creation of the courts for the purpose,
among others, of protecting the people from governmental excesses").
303 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) ("[A]
municipality may not empower its licensing officials to roam essentially at will, dispensing
or withholding permission to speak . . . according to their own opinions."); Freedman v.
Maryland 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (faulting a censorship scheme for lacking "sufficient
safeguards for confining the censor's action to judicially determined constitutional limits");
Monaghan, supra note 33, at 524-25 ("[N]o procedure is valid which leaves the protected
character of speech to the final determination of an administrative agency ....
").
304Monaghan, supra note 33, at 551; cf Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of
due process is a requirement of judicial process.").
305 Arthur Earl Bonfield, The FederalAPA and State AdministrativeLaw, 72 VA. L. Rev.
297, 297 (1986).
306 See, e.g., JoHN H. REESE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 221
(1995) (indicating that in survey of some state APAs, no state "has rulemaking provisions
that approach the formality of the federal APA"); id. at 260 (indicating that most states
surveyed "do not specify that such [adjudication] procedures be 'on the record').
307 See supra notes 185, 221 and accompanying text.
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be less likely to consider constitutional norms carefully when they operate
outside more formalized procedures. To this extent, some state agencies might
pose heightened risk to individual rights.
From this perspective, the theory here is especially necessary in the state
sphere because constitutional challenges sometimes may be the only practical
option to protect individuals from overreaching agencies. It is not coincidental
that many of the examples discussed here - Baze, Turner, Grutter, and the free

speech licensing cases - address state agencies that, largely left to their own
devices, designed or implemented policies raising serious constitutional
concerns. To be clear, the proposal here would not permit federal courts to
supplement state administrative law requirements. 30 8 But courts already often
make deference determinations in constitutional cases involving states. This
implicit power to determine when deference is merited, coupled with due
process norms through which courts can protect constitutional individual
rights, should allow federal courts to inquire into the nature of state agency
actions that pose heightened risk of constitutional violation.
D.

ContextualNuances

1. Contextual Limitations
The theory proposed here should be applied flexibly, with attention to
context and the terrific variety of administrative action. 30 9 Administrative law
norms have been undervalued in individual rights cases involving
administrative agencies, but some factors may have greater force than others in
particular circumstances. For example, certain administrative agents, such as
police, must make quick, on-the-spot decisions that preclude issuing
simultaneous reasoned explanations. Other agencies, such as the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, must make certain determinations thousands of times
annually, so it would be impractical to require for each decision the same kind
of rigorous procedures expected of an agency issuing an important
rulemaking. 310 Still other agencies like the military might want to insulate
particular decisions from democratic scrutiny for national security reasons.
While all these actions certainly should be subject to constitutional challenge,
it would be unrealistic and foolish to expect these agents always to comply
with the rigorous procedures we typically expect of agencies promulgating
more ordinary rules.
In short, the factors here should be applied with common sense. If particular
agencies have compelling reasons for not adhering to particular norms in
308 State courts making deference determinations in cases challenging the
constitutionality of state agency action, of course, could draw on state administrative law
requirements in determining the level of deference to grant the state agency.
309 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
310 See, e.g., id. at 233 (stating that forty-six different Customs offices issue 10,000 to

15,000 classifications each year).
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particular contexts, courts should not thoughtlessly relax deference for failure
to comply. Lower courts, in fact, sometimes may fashion their procedures to
account for unique governmental interests while still remaining sensitive to
individual rights. Trial courts, for instance, could permit the military to make
in camera showings that certain challenged policies should not be public. In
other words, the theory proposed here should be applied to strike a sensible
balance between rights and discretion.
2.

When Accountability and Expertise Collide

Courts should also be aware that factors might sometimes collide. When
most or all of the administrative factors point in the same direction,
determining the level of deference accorded to an agency will be relatively
straightforward. The difficult deference determinations will be when the
factors point in different directions, such as when an agency acts with political
accountability or expertise but not both. For example, sometimes the White
House puts political pressure on administrative agencies to adopt a particular
311
policy, even if the technical evidence might point towards a different policy.
In such instances, the agency's political accountability might actually interfere
3 12
with its ability to make use of its expertise.
State Farm can be understood in these terms. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) rescission of a rule requiring automatic
restraints in automobiles clearly resulted from White House pressure.31 3 As
Professor Edley points out, politics's role here should not have surprised
anyone; candidate Ronald Reagan had campaigned in 1980 on a deregulation
platform and had specifically identified the automobile industry as overregulated.3 14 The NHTSA's rescission of the rule, then, was not based on
evaluation of technical evidence regarding safety but rather was "all but
ordained by the election results. '3 15 In State Farm, the Court ordered that the

311

See, e.g., Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that

the FDA's decision to make Plan B contraception available only to women over seventeen
emanated from White House pressure and lacked usual, good faith agency procedures); Jody
Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SuP.

CT. REv. 51, 55 (discussing "accounts ...[that] as MA v EPA moved through the courts the
[Bush] administration had been altering scientific reports, silencing its own experts, and
suppressing scientific information that was politically inconvenient").
312 See, e.g., Watts, supra note 194, at 11-12 (describing the "political zigzagging"
during the Bush and Obama administrations that resulted in numerous changes of direction
on motor vehicle emissions).
313

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59

(1983) (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (ascribing the agency's altered standard to the election of
President Ronald Reagan in 1980).
"I See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 64 (1990).
315

Id. at 65.
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matter be remanded to the NHTSA, in significant part because the agency had
failed to give adequate explanation for rescinding the rule. 31 6 But while the
outcome in State Farm is certainly defensible, 31 7 the Court did not resolve the
larger question of how courts should approach agency decisions relying on
3 18
political pressure rather than expert analysis.
Just as expertise may be compromised for political reasons, Congress
sometimes insulates agencies from politics so that they can exercise their
expertise without external pressure. For example, Congress deliberately
structured the Federal Reserve to limit its political accountability, and many
observers believe that such political insulation likely improves monetary
policy. 31 9 Insulation of agencies, however, can also be pernicious. Sometimes

legislatures protect agencies from oversight to conceal practices reflecting
poorly on governmental officials. The story of lethal injection, for example,
includes some state governments' efforts to hide serious problems with the
procedures they designed. 320 A difficult question, then, is how to treat
delegations where the legislature deliberately insulates the agency from not
just political pressure but also from administrative law more generally.
While it would be difficult to devise a systematic judicial approach to these
issues, the decision to insulate particular policy from democratic review
deserves less deference when it is motivated not by genuine policy concerns
but rather by a desire to conceal governmental incompetence or
malfeasance. 321 To this extent, courts should consider whether certain agency

316 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 ("[I]t is the agency's responsibility, not this Court's, to
explain its decision.").
317 See id. at 50 (rejecting the agency's "post hoc rationalizations for agency action");
Stack, supra note 281, at 963 (discussing State Farm in light of Chenery's rule that courts
upholding agency decisions must do so in terms used by the agency itself).
318 See Watts, supra note 194, at 33-39 (calling for greater coherence to administrative
law's vacillation between expertise and politics).
319 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Casefor JudicialReview, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1717 (2008) ("[M]ost of us do not think it unfair to put control of
interest rates and the money supply in the hands of an independent Federal Reserve Board
). Of course,
..... agency decision making can never be wholly immune from politics, see
Barkow, supra note 218, at 23, and politics can affect even an independent agency like the
Federal Reserve, whose Chairman is nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006). Moreover, to the extent that Congress's decision to
limit the Federal Reserve's political accountability arose from a democratic process, that
decision was itself a political result. See Barkow, supra note 218, at 19 ("The main aim in
creating an independent agency is to immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure.").
320 See, e.g., Denno, supra note 41, at 116-18 (discussing "missing information" about
states' lethal injection protocols).
321 See, e.g., Watts, supra note 194, at 56 (arguing that courts should be unwilling to
view political arguments as rational considerations when they are driven by raw politics but
should be more willing to accept political influences implementing "policy concerns and
public values" tied to the statutory scheme).
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responses to political pressures are more justifiable, such as when agencies try
to implement public values. 322 Admittedly, it is not easy for courts always to
distinguish political insulation driven by actual policy concerns rather than
cynical politics. Courts, however, can sometimes distinguish public values
323
from corruption or malfeasance and, in such cases, should do so.
Nevertheless, because the level of deference under this theory exists on a
sliding scale anyway, when the factors cut in different directions, the level of
deference presumably would often be in the middle - neither especially
rigorous nor especially forgiving. In such instances, the case's outcome will
more likely turn not on institutional issues but on the substantive constitutional
inquiry.
III.
A.

APPLICATIONS, ADVANTAGES, AND IMPLICATIONS

Applications

1. Deference Revisited
The theory proposed here would have a significant effect on the analysis in
cases in which the Court downplayed administrative law norms and ignored
agency shortcomings. Consequently, while the application differs in each
context, the theory here may often result in less deference to the agency than
the Court's current approach.
a. Baze
Attention to ordinary administrative law norms calls into serious question
the deferential approach in Baze, which explicitly deferred to the Kentucky
legislature's execution procedure. 324 Far from "implementing" the execution
procedure, as the Baze plurality claimed, the Kentucky legislature had virtually
nothing to do with it. Greater attention to the constitutional "who" would have
helped avoid this inaccurate conflation.
Greater attention to the constitutional "how" would also have pointed
against deference. With regards to the agency's democratic legitimacy, the
Kentucky legislature provided minimal guidance to the Department of
Corrections (DOC), specifying neither the drugs nor the details of drug
administration. 325 Nor was there evidence that the legislative delegatee - the
322 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 286, at 1180 (arguing that judicial deference to
agencies should turn in part on whether the agency acts consistent with larger public norms).
323 See Watts, supra note 194, at 9 (proposing that courts should accept political

influences that "seek to further policy considerations or public values" but reject political
influences that represent "partisan politics unconnected in any way to the statutory scheme
being implemented").
324 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion).
325 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 431.220(l)(a) (West 2006) ("[E]very death sentence shall

be executed by continuous intravenous injection of a substance or combination of
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DOC director - designed, implemented, or oversaw the procedure. 326 To the
contrary, DOC directors typically delegate the matter to prison
officials, who
327

then delegate it to prison guards and independent contractors.
Moreover, Kentucky, like most states, kept secret its execution protocols
from both the public and the condemned inmates. 328 While states certainly
have a legitimate interest in concealing the identity of their execution team
members, their refusal to disclose information like drug doses, monitoring
practices, and contingency plans merely hides the fact that execution
procedures have been poorly designed. 329 Thus, the responsible officials
hardly enjoyed the kind of political accountability justifying deference.
Those officials also lacked the expertise we usually assume administrative
agencies possess. Many team members responsible for executions lacked basic
understanding of the drugs and their risks. 330 Remarkably, though, the Justices
largely missed this issue. Of the seven separate opinions in Baze, only Justice
Stevens's concurrence, which no one else joined, addressed this problem,
emphasizing that state officials "with no specialized medical knowledge and
without the benefit of expert assistance or guidance" do not deserve "the kind
'33
of deference afforded legislative decisions. '
As for rule-of-law concerns, Kentucky did not adopt its lethal injection
procedures through formalized administrative procedures. 332 To the contrary,

substances sufficient to cause death."); Baze v. Rees, No. 04-1094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *3
(Cir. Ct. Ky. July 8, 2005) ("[P]ersons assigned the initial task of drafting the
Commonwealth of Kentucky's first lethal injection protocol were provided with little to no
guidance on drafting a lethal injection protocol[.]").
326 See Baze v. Rees, No. 04-1094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *5 ("Those persons who
developed Kentucky's lethal injection protocol were apparently given the task without the
benefit of scientific aid or policy oversight ....
").
327 In most states with developed records, the legislature remains disconnected from the
creation and implementation of lethal injection procedures. To the extent the Kentucky
record is silent on these matters, the Court should have remanded for more facts rather than
assume these matters in the State's favor. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 114 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for remand); Berger, supra note 41, at 261, 303 (discussing gaps in
Kentucky's record).
328 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 120 n.5 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting); Deborah W. Denno, The
Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM
L. REv. 49, 95 (2007) ("States never have been forthcoming about how they perform lethal
injections.").
329 Berger, supra note 41, at 304-06.
330 See, e.g., id. at 268-70 (discussing problem of unqualified personnel in lethal injection
procedures).
331 Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was also the author of
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), suggesting that he may have been more
attentive to these concerns than other Justices.
332 Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (describing Kentucky and other states' development of lethal
injection as a "stereotyped reaction to an issue, rather than a careful analysis of relevant
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like many other states, Kentucky designed its lethal injection procedures in
secret without the benefit of outside input that accompanies more formal
procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking. 333 The State also failed
to justify the design it chose.
Had the plurality in Baze been accustomed to considering administrative
norms in constitutional cases, it would have been less likely to ignore these
shortcomings and offer blanket, unstudied deference to a state that had largely
abdicated responsibility for its execution procedures. 334 Perhaps the plaintiffs
still would have lost for failure to present much evidence of danger, or perhaps
federalism concerns might have militated for some deference. 335 The holding,
however, would not have rested on the canard that the challenged procedure
represented the considered decision of the Kentucky legislature.
b.

Grutter

Grutter also largely failed to engage rigorously with administrative norms
that might have tempered or, alternatively, better justified the deference it
offered. With regards to political accountability, the legislature played no role
in the Law School's admissions policy. The Court did not address this lack of
democratic pedigree, even though, as Professor Guinier has argued, "The task
of constituting each class [at selective public universities] ... implicates...
the larger society's sense of itself as a democracy. '336 Bakke, as we have
already seen, expressed great concern that decisions so important to democracy
and social mobility were left to administrative actors, but Grutter barely
33 7
acknowledged the issue.
Grutter also failed to account for the transparency of the admissions
decisions. Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, the Court in Grutterdeferred to the
Law School's admissions policy, which concealed the precise role race played
in admissions decisions, whereas in Gratz it struck down the undergraduate
policy, which more candidly stipulated how many "points" race earned a
candidate. 338 The Court offered justifications for its approach, 339 but it failed

considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
313See Morales v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 732-33 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (declaring the adoption of a lethal injection procedure invalid under California
administrative law); Evans v. Maryland, 914 A.2d 25, 80-81 (Md. 2006) (same in
Maryland); Berger, supra note 41, at 326.
334See Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (warning that judicial intervention would interfere with state
expertise in lethal injection).
331See Berger, supra note 41, at 279.
336 Guinier, supra note 61, at 135.
331See supra Part I.A.2.
338 Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318-22 (2003) (summarizing
complicated evidence regarding precisely how race figures into law school admissions),
with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003) (explaining that the undergraduate
admissions policy gave twenty points for "membership in an underrepresented racial or
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to address fully its seemingly peculiar preference for the less transparent
policy.

340

Grutter also ignored a political-authority factor that might have helped it
justify deference.
As Governor Granholm argued in an amicus brief,
"Michigan's Constitution confers a unique autonomous status on its public
universities" and thus vests "plenary authority over educational matters" to the
university and its regents. 341 In other words, even though the Law School
policy might have lacked the oversight, transparency, and legislative guidance
typically necessary to trigger deference, the Court may have concluded that the
university's independence under the Michigan Constitution provided sufficient
political authority. Moreover, to the extent an elected Board of Regents
govern university policy, the Court could have further connected the
challenged policy to the people of the state. 342 Once again, whereas Justices in
Bakke explicitly addressed this issue, 343 Grutterdid not, thus failing to paint a
complete picture of whether the policy deserved deference on political
authority grounds.
The Court's approach to the other administrative law inquiries was also
incomplete. With regards to expertise, the Court failed to explore why
deference to the university's educational judgment was appropriate in Grutter
but not in Gratz.344 If Grutter is correct that universities are uniquely

ethnic minority group" and that 100 points guaranteed admission).
339 See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
340 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems especially unfair to
treat the candor of the admissions plan as an Achilles' heel."); Guinier, supra note 61, at
194-95 (arguing that Grutter encourages admissions officials to make decisions with less
transparency).
341 Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm at 13-14, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516) (arguing that the university's
choice to enroll a diverse student body is entitled to deference under the Michigan
Constitution).
342 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 252 n.2 (noting that the Michigan Board of Regents was the
proper defendant in the case); About the Board of Regents, U. MICHIGAN,
http://www.regents.umich.edu/about/ (last visited December 21, 2010) ("The University is
governed by the [elected] Board of Regents, [which has] . . . 'general supervision' of the
institution."); supra Part II.B.1.d.
133 Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978)
("[Ilsolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those
decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined
criteria."), with id. at 366 n.42 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We
... find nothing in the Equal Protection Clause that requires us to depart from established
principle by limiting the scope of power the [elected] Regents may exercise more narrowly
than the powers that may constitutionally be wielded by the Assembly.").
344 Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("The Law School's educational judgment that
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer."), with Gratz,
539 U.S. at 270 (rejecting admissions policy designed "to achieve the interest in educational
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positioned to recognize the benefits that diversity brings to the educational
experience, 345 one would think that the same should have been true in Gratz.
Of course, the discrepancy between the cases is largely explained by Justices
O'Connor's and Breyer's votes, but the majority opinions themselves do not
reconcile their apparently contradictory approaches to epistemic authority.
authority seems
Accordingly, Grutter'sdeference to the university's epistemic
346
superficial and, though justifiable, largely unjustified.

This deference appears even more sui generis in light of ParentsInvolved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District, which just four years later

refused to defer to school districts wishing to take race into account to achieve
racially diverse public schools. 347 Perhaps the Court might have concluded
that the University of Michigan's expertise as to the educational merits of
diversity exceeded that of the Seattle and Louisville school districts, but the
Court failed to explore this distinction carefully in either case. The result,
unsurprisingly, is that both opinions on the highly sensitive topic of
educational racial diversity are inadequately theorized.
As for rule-of-law considerations, the discrepancies between Grutter and
Gratz do reflect some attention to administrative process. Whereas the Court
upheld the Law School's admissions policy in Grutter because it was
sufficiently individualized, it rejected the undergraduate policy in Gratz
because it mechanically added points to an application on the basis of race. 348
The Court therefore did consider the care with which the admissions policies
were implemented as part of its equal protection analysis. But it failed to look
more generally at the processes by which the admissions policies had been
adopted. Nor did it follow Bakke's lead in examining whether the Law
School's faculty possessed the authority to make such an important policy
349
determination itself.

diversity"). The Court also rejected Virginia's asserted educational judgment that single-sex
education contributes to "diversity in educational approaches." United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996).
141 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (accepting that "complex educational judgments"
underlying affirmative action lie "primarily within the expertise of the university").
346 Professor Horwitz persuasively justifies Grutter's deference by emphasizing that
courts are ill equipped to evaluate academic determinations made by universities, which are
"First Amendment institutions ...vital to public discourse." Horwitz, supra note 11, at
1128. However, as he explains, the Court failed to theorize adequately the deference in
Grutterand other cases involving universities. See id. at 1128-39.
14' 551 U.S. 701, 724-25 (2007).
348 Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (finding that the admissions committee properly
considered race as a "'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and
every applicant"), with Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72 (faulting the admissions policy for not
providing sufficiently individualized consideration).
341See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-15 (summarizing a faculty vote to adopt affirmative
action plan); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (2003).

2011]

CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING

2087

Of course, while it sounds nobly democratic to allow the broader population
to help shape the relationship between higher education and social mobility,
such an approach might create other problems. For one, broader referenda
seeking popular input on such questions have sometimes been confusing,
resulting in disagreements about whether voters actually understood the
questions presented. 350 And even without such confusion, many voters may
vote based solely on their perceived self-interest and not based on any vision of
societal structure and mobility. Regardless of whether the resulting outcomes
are preferable, a more democratic process does not necessarily lead to
substantially more careful popular deliberation. That being said, such
processes at least create more opportunity for democratic discourse.
Grutter's failure to engage with these important inquiries more carefully is
regrettable and, in light of the discrepancies with Bakke, Gratz, and Parents
Involved, confusing. Moreover, by not addressing these issues with any rigor,
the Grutter majority left itself vulnerable to sharp criticism for deferring to the
3 51
Law School notwithstanding the strict scrutiny it purported to apply.
Grutter's failure even to acknowledge Bakke's concern that it may be
problematic for administrative agencies to make important decisions shaping
the "allocation of opportunity and status" 352 indicates the shallowness of the
constitutional analysis.
c. Korematsu
Korematsu is one of the more notorious decisions in constitutional
history, 353 but the Court might have avoided its regrettable decision had it more
carefully considered the factors addressed here. Because the policy plainly
discriminated on the basis of race, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to
determine whether the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. 354 In

See, e.g., Michael S. Moses et al., Investigating the Defeat of Colorado'sAmendment
46: An Analysis of Trends and Principal Factors Influencing Voter Behaviors, THE
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (September 9, 2010),
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/colorado-46/2010-11-12-defeat-of-amendment46report-final.pdf (discussing voter confusion resulting from poorly worded referendum
ballot).
"' See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Nor does the Constitution
countenance the unprecedented deference the Court gives to the Law School, an approach
inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scrutiny."').
352 Guinier, supra note 61, at 140.
353 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of ConstitutionalLaw, 111
HARv. L. REV. 963, 1018 (1998) (discussing Korematsu as an anti-canonical case "that any
theory worth its salt must show [is] wrongly decided").
354Though Korematsu announced the doctrinal rule that race-based classifications trigger
"rigid" scrutiny, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), it would be
inaccurate to say the Court applied contemporary strict scrutiny, which had not yet taken
shape. See Fallon, supra note 56, at 1277.
350
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ostensibly applying this level of scrutiny, however, the Court gave substantial
deference to the military, accepting "the judgment of the military
authorities.., that there were disloyal members of that [Japanese] population,
whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained,"
thus demanding "prompt and adequate measures be taken. '355 In other words,
the Court deferred to the government's expert determination that the detention
of Japanese Americans was necessary for national security, because it was
356
impossible to sort out the loyal from the disloyal.
Had the Court looked more closely at administrative factors, it might have
been less willing to defer to that determination. 357 With regards to democratic
legitimacy, a closer inquiry would have revealed that neither Congress nor the
President created the policy or vested the military with specific authority to
segregate Japanese Americans. 358 The Court, then, deferred to General
DeWitt, even though he may well have lacked legal authority to create a rule
raising such serious equal protection concerns. 359 Of course, the internment
policy is offensive and almost certainly unconstitutional under current equal
protection doctrine, 360 so the Court's deference to General DeWitt is only part
of the problem with its analysis. But closer attention to administrative law
norms may have made it clearer that the General lacked the authority to
legalize racism. 36 ' Such an approach would have also been more in line with
Endo, in which the Court emphasized that the agency in question had not been
362
delegated authority to carry out its detention policy.

355Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99
(1943)).
356 See id.
at 223 (arguing that Korematsu was excluded from the military area "because

[the military] decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of
Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily").
151 See Harlan Grant Cohen, "Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and The Lessons
of History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 957, 960 (2010) (explaining that Korematsu represents how "an

overly deferential Court can unwittingly aid an overly aggressive Executive in unnecessary,
panic-driven wartime attacks on civil liberties").
358 See BLACK, supra note 33, at 81.
319Cf Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006) (striking down an interpretive
rule exceeding the statutory delegation).
360 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("A Korematsu-type classification ... will never again survive scrutiny."); Mark
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L.

REV. 273, 296 ("Korematsu seems now to be regarded almost universally as wrongly
decided.").

361 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
legalization of racism."). The APA had not yet been enacted
Korematsu, but the Justices certainly would have been familiar
here.
362 See Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944) ("Neither the
language of detention.").

("I dissent ... from this
when the Court decided
with the norms explored
Act nor the orders use the
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More careful consideration of expertise might also have counseled against
such deference. 363 In Korematsu, the Court took for granted the military's
expertise and therefore accepted the necessity of the internment program.
Closer inspection of the record, however, calls into serious question the
necessity of the exclusion program. 364 While General DeWitt was a military
expert, he never established himself to be an expert on that particular question
- that is, on the necessity of the internment program. 365 To the contrary, as
Justice Murphy pointed out in dissent, the military failed to marshal any
reliable evidence showing that Japanese Americans posed any threat justifying
their collective intemment. 366 Instead, DeWitt's "evidence" consisted of
unsupported, racist assumptions that Japanese Americans were inherently
treacherous. 367 Further, DeWitt failed to explain why disloyal members of the
368
Indeed, the
Japanese community could not be separated from loyal ones.

363 See supraPart II.B.2.
36 Of course, it is easy to challenge the necessity of the plan with the benefit of hindsight
and the comfort of having won the war. See Tushnet, supra note 360, at 287 ("[P]olicymakers were acting in real time, when they did not know that the United States would win
the war .... "). Nevertheless, even at the time, significant evidence suggested that the
policy was not necessary. See IRONS, supra note 69, at 201-02 (explaining that General
DeWitt, in a confidential memorandum, conceded that "there was time to determine loyalty"
before relocating people to internment camps).
365 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the military
determination rested on "an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and
insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people with
racial and economic prejudices"); Neil Gotanda, The Story of Korematsu: The JapaneseAmerican Cases, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 249, 260 (Michael C. Doff ed., 2004)

(discussing Justice Murphy's review of the military actions taken by General DeWitt and
how the "forced exclusion was the result ... of racial guilt rather than bona fide military
necessity").
366 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[N]o reliable evidence is
cited to show that [Japanese Americans] were generally disloyal, or had generally so
conducted themselves in this area as to constitute a special menace to defense installations
or war industries, or had otherwise by their behavior furnished reasonable ground for their
exclusion as a group."); Tushnet, supra note 360, at 288 (recounting historical record and
concluding that "DeWitt . . . was a racist who simply assumed, without evidence, that
Japanese Americans posed a threat of sabotage and espionage").
367 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
justifications "for the forced evacuation ... do not prove a reasonable relation between the
group characteristics of Japanese Americans and the dangers of invasion, sabotage and
espionage").
361 See id. at 241 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("No adequate reason is given for the failure to
treat these Japanese Americans on an individual basis by holding investigations and
hearings to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was done in the case of persons of
German and Italian ancestry."); IRONS, supra note 69, at 201-02; cf Joel B. Grossman, The
JapaneseAmerican Cases and the Vagaries of ConstitutionalAdjudication in Wartime: An
Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. REv. 649, 656-67 (1997) (quoting General
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evidence supporting the policy was so weak that several decades later, a
federal district court reversed Mr. Korematsu's conviction, indicating that
DeWitt's fear of Japanese Americans had been unfounded.36 9 Had the Court
not taken epistemic authority for granted, it would likely have scrutinized the
military's flimsy evidence and justifications for the internment program more
carefully.
Of course, some deference may still have been appropriate. Probably more
than any other agency, the military deserves deference on national security
issues, especially in wartime.370 Furthermore, even though neither Congress
nor the President authorized such blatant racial segregation, they certainly
knew about it and did not prohibit it. 37 1 From this perspective, the
administrative factors considered here probably would not have militated for
the most rigorous review - though, of course, today the racial classification
would trigger strict scrutiny.
Although some deference may have been appropriate, administrative law
norms do not justify the Court's excessive deference to the military's
determination that the exclusion of Japanese Americans was necessary. As
Endo demonstrates, deference to the government on national security matters
should not require courts to accept everything the government says.372 When
the Court blindly accepts governmental officials' assertions, people like
Korematsu will never get "a responsible and competent judgment on the
constitutionality of what has been done to him. ' 373 Indeed, the Court in
Korematsu deferred even though neither Congress nor the President had
authorized a race-based exclusion. The Court, thus, not only deferred without
examination to General DeWitt's highly questionable factual assertions that
Japanese Americans threatened national security but also effectively ceded to
him the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Such abdication of judicial
responsibility to protect core constitutional values is unjustifiable, even in
wartime.
These mistakes were avoidable. Attention to the poor democratic and
administrative pedigree of the internment policy would have prompted closer

DeWitt's claim that "there isn't such a thing as a loyal Japanese and it is impossible to
determine their loyalty by investigation").
369 See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
370 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (explaining that the Court
accords "Congress great deference" in the areas of "national defense and military affairs");
WILLIAM

H.

REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE

225 (1998) (arguing that law will "not be

silent in time of war," but that it will speak with a "somewhat different voice").
371 Elected officials had not reached agreement on how to deal with the situation. See
supra note 69, at 25-48.
See, e.g., Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Lewis Carroll
notwithstanding, the fact that the government has 'said it thrice' does not make an allegation
IRONS,
372

true." (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK 3 (1876)).
373 BLACK,

supra note 33, at 78.
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judicial inquiry into these issues and militated against the deference the Court
reflexively granted. Given that the racial exclusion triggered heightened
scrutiny, a less deferential approach very well could have resulted in a different
outcome.
d.

Prison Condition Cases

Prison condition cases refer to a class of cases, so the impact of the theory
proposed here would turn on the particulars of each case. The Court, however,
often utilizes a "one-size-fits-all approach" to deference that ignores different
types of prison regulations and their contexts. 374 In some cases, deference
might be deserved. Prison officials, after all, can claim an epistemic authority
over prison issues, justifying judicial deference to their "professional
judgment. '375 But prison regulations are put in place with varying degrees of
and
procedural regularity,
oversight,
transparency,
accountability,
consideration of constitutional concerns. By shortchanging these multiple
factors, courts exempt prison regulations from important accountability
mechanisms, cutting off an inquiry that would determine whether the
376
presumptive deference is deserved in given circumstances.
Relatedly, the Court's assumption that prison officials necessarily enjoy an
expertise deserving of deference is questionable. Forty-three percent of the
nation's 1208 adult prisons remain unaccredited by the American Correctional
Association, suggesting a lack of uniformity among prison practices, including
hiring practices. 377 While lack of hiring uniformity does not necessarily
indicate incompetence, some prisons fail to employ qualified staffs and adhere
to generally accepted standards. 378 Indeed, a major commission report
strongly
recommended
correctional
facilities
reviewing American
strengthening professional standards, thus casting doubt on Turner's
assumption that experts necessarily craft prison policies. 37 9 More careful
review of the judicial deference offered in each prison case may not always
change the outcome, but it would lead to more nuanced consideration of both
the challenged regulations and the administrative pedigree behind those
regulations.
Such attention would help the Court explain its (usually) relaxed review of
prison conditions in recent decades. 380 It would also have forced the Court to
171 See

Shay, supra note 91, at 341.

375Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006).
376 See GIBBONS & DE B. KATZENBACH, supra note 98, at 79-94 (discussing the pressing

need for external oversight and internal accountability measures in prisons).
177Id. at 88-89.
378 See id. at 70-73.
379Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-87 (1987) (justifying deference to prison

officials' "expertise"), with GIBBONS & DE B. KATZENBACH, supra note 98, at 90-92
(recommending improved professional standards).
380 The Court's recent decision in Brown v. Platademonstrates the Court's willingness to
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justify more carefully both parts of Turner. Given that Turner's seemingly
contrary holdings partially rested on the Court's acceptance of the prison
officials' expertise for the correspondence regulation and its rejection of that
expertise for the marriage regulation,38 ' a greater focus on administrative law
norms would have helped the Court test its assumption that the prison
administrators knew what they were doing in one context but not the other.
Even if such inquiries did not yield a different outcome, they would have
improved the judicial analysis by helping assure that judicial deference
actually rested on an examination of the institution at issue.
2. Other Applications
As for the cases discussed in Part I.B, we see that the Court sometimes takes
account of administrative law norms, albeit in a haphazard, inchoate way. The
theory proposed here would call more systematic attention to the fact of
administrative action. It would also make clear that agencies' decision-making
structures necessarily affect individual rights and therefore should be
considered when courts review agency actions allegedly infringing on those
rights. Because cases such as Mow Sun Wong, Freedman, and Boumediene

each considered some of these factors, my theory may not substantially affect
the Court's approach in these cases. Nevertheless, greater attention to
administrative law norms in those cases would have helped bring those factors
into sharper focus, making them a more consistent and explicit feature of the
doctrinal inquiry.
This theory could also impact other constitutional cases involving
administrative officials. In the commercial-speech context, for instance, the
factors explored here could help courts determine whether the relevant
administrators weighed the proper factors while trying to regulate deceptive
advertisements. 382 Similarly, in the criminal justice context, this theory could
call more careful attention to the significant discretion courts often accord
police and prosecutors. 383 A fuller examination of this theory's relevance to

uphold dramatic remedial injunctions when states persistently fail to correct Eighth
Amendment violations. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923-24 (2011) (affirming a
remedial order requiring California to reduce its prison population within two years). Such
judicial intervention, however, has more often been the exception rather than the norm in
recent decades. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 93, at 39-51; supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
381 See supra Part I.A.4.
382 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Court. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) (authorizing compelled disclosures on part of advertiser to avoid the
possibility of deceiving consumers). But see Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof' Reg., 512
U.S. 136, 143 (1994) (suggesting that government must demonstrate real harms rather than
merely speculating that commercial speech is misleading).
383 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessonsfrom AdministrativeLaw, 61 STAN. L. REv. 869, 870 (2009) ("It is hard to overstate
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these issues is beyond the scope of this article, but these types of inquiries
could add greater nuance and depth to the Court's examination of various
constitutional claims against administrative actors.
B.

Advantages
1.

Constitutional Adherence

The theory proposed here would encourage greater adherence to
to
constitutional norms. In particular, it may encourage administrative officials 384
consider constitutional issues as they design and implement their policies.
Agencies sometimes become tunnel-visioned, focusing so much on policy
385
goals that they ignore other important values, including constitutional ones.
By linking judicial deference in constitutional cases to agency behavior, courts
would encourage agencies to consider constitutional values more carefully
without substantially hampering their effectiveness. Given that administrative
officials whose actions affect constitutional rights can function outside the
important to encourage agencies
scope of administrative laws, it is especially
386
to take account of constitutional values.
Additionally, this theory would remind courts that judicial deference to
agencies should not extend to questions of constitutional law. Administrative
agencies may enjoy superior epistemic authority to courts over many matters,
but a court's "special claim to competency," as Professor Fiss put it, lies "in

the power of federal prosecutors."); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 151-56 (2004)
(contending that the electorate's capacity to hold prosecutors accountable for their actions is
"more fiction that fact"); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: StipulatingAway
ProsecutorialAccountability?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939, 963 (1997) ("The problem ... is that
even direct elections are not likely to prove an effective means of giving prosecutors
guidance as to a community's enforcement priorities or of holding them accountable for the
discretionary decisions that they have already made."); William J. Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 12-13 (1996)
(discussing the reasons courts delegate broad discretion to police and prosecutors).
184 Cf Metzger, supra note 24, at 497-505 (discussing cases "encouraging agencies to
take constitutional values and concerns into account in their decisionmaking").
385 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 286, at 1174-75 ("[A]gencies tend toward tunnel
vision, where they pursue their statutory mission with varying degrees of diligence, but
often without sufficient regard to a larger normative framework such as the Constitution.");
Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of JudicialReview: A Constitutional Census of
the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 506-07 (1997) (arguing that bureaucracies'
missions tend "to dwarf competing values" so that bureaucrats often ignore constitutional
issues); Monaghan, supra note 33, at 523 (discussing "institutional 'tunnel vision'" in
censors and labor boards).
386 Cf Metzger, supra note 24, at 534 ("[U]sing ordinary administrative law to encourage
administrative constitutionalism ... represents an important tool for ensuring constitutional
enforcement while also respecting political branch prerogatives.").
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the domain of constitutional values. ' 387 By avoiding reflexive deference to
agencies in constitutional cases, courts would be better able to provide
independent judicial evaluation of the alleged constitutional injury.
2.

Democratic Accountability

The theory here would also encourage elected legislatures and chief
executives to take responsibility for policies. Legislatures often delegate
difficult policy questions to agencies to avoid taking the political heat for
controversial policy determinations. As John Hart Ely stated, "[T]he common
case of nonaccountability involves ... a situation where the legislature (in
large measure precisely in order to escape accountability) has refused to draw
the legally operative distinctions, leaving that chore to others who are not
politically accountable. '388 If legislatures knew that courts would scrutinize
more closely the constitutionality of agency actions where legislative input is
minimal or vague, legislatures might be inclined to legislate more precisely
and oversee more closely. 389 Of course, given that legislatures punt to
agencies to avoid accountability, more stringent review of agency action might
not necessarily translate into greater legislative care. More rigorous judicial
review, however, should encourage more careful delegations on the margins;
even the most cynical politicians might fear that judicial invalidations of
agency policies would eventually reflect badly on the legislators themselves.
To this extent, the inquiries proposed here may be "democracy-forcing,"
helping to ensure that "certain choices are made by an institution with a
superior democratic pedigree. '390 Agency expertise is still often very valuable,
but government generally functions better when elected officials are
391
engaged.
Some critics might contend that current governmental policies are
sufficiently democratic because a legislature's failure to reverse agency policy
constitutes tacit approval. 392 This argument overvalues legislative silence.
Numerous veto-gates prevent the enactment of even some popular bills, thus

387 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1, 34 (1979).
388 ELY, supra note 188, at 130-31.
389 Cf John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv.

1541, 1543 (2008) ("[N]ondelegation canons have the collateral benefit of promoting
congressional responsibility for lawmaking .....
390 Sunstein, supra note 207, at 317.
391 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME

COURT 24 (1999) (arguing in favor of constitutional doctrines which "promote electoral
control by helping to ensure that politically accountable actors make important decisions").
392 See BICKEL, supra note 9, at 19-20 (arguing that judges should exercise restraint when
reviewing agency actions, because agency policies "are reversible by legislative
majorities").
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Moreover, in some
sometimes obstructing democratic preferences. 393
instances, such as lethal injection, the legislature likely knows little about the
policy. 394

In other instances, the legislature's inaction likely results from

political cowardice, not approval. 395 Thus, as Professor Stewart contends,
"Individual politicians often find far more to be lost than gained in taking a
readily identifiable stand on a controversial issue of social or economic
policy.

'396

3. Recognition of the Variety of Agency Action
The theory presented here also has the advantage of taking account of the
numerous and complicated variables surrounding the exercise of governmental
power. Critics might contend that a multi-factor inquiry like the one proposed
here will only sow uncertainty into the law and give too much power to
courts. 3 9 7 But the world is complicated, and legal doctrine should be nuanced
enough to appreciate important differences. 398 In particular, agencies exist in
many shapes and take many kinds of actions, and a one-size-fits-all approach
to deference does not take proper account of those differences. As the
Supreme Court explained, "Although we all accept the position that the
Judiciary should defer to at least some of this multifarious administrative
action, we have to decide how to take account of the great range of its
variety. ' 399 Thus, just as the Court in Mead reinvigorated Skidmore v. Swift
Co. and allowed for judicial deference to agency action based upon "those
factors which give [the agency] the power to persuade," 40 0 the theory proposed
here allows courts to consider various factors cutting for or against deference.

393See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 720 (1992) (discussing numerous points at which
congressional bills can be killed).
...See Berger, supra note 41, at 311 (discussing lethal injection and "elected officials'
utter inattention to the protocol's design").
311 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 188, at 131-32 ("[O]n most hard issues our representatives

quite shrewdly prefer not to have to stand up and be counted but rather to let some
executive-branch bureaucrat... take the inevitable political heat." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
396 Stewart, supra note 29, at 1695; cf Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty.,
dissenting) ("[V]indication by congressional inaction is
480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
a canard.").
397See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Mead for bringing uncertainty into administrative law by
reinvigorating "th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test").
398 See Farina, supra note 156, at 989 ("There are no simple rules for this complex
world.").
399Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.
410Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
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Such an approach might be especially useful for constitutional challenges to
state administrative action, given the great "variety among state administrative
40 1
laws."
Moreover, to the extent that the Court already offers deference to
government agencies in some individual rights cases, this theory does not
complicate the judicial inquiry so much as it encourages more systematic,
consistent examination.
While the numerous factors considered here
admittedly will give judges flexibility that may result in uncertainty, the
Court's current approach to deference entertains numerous (sometimes
unarticulated) factors and is far from predictable. More explicit attention to the
variety of agency action, then, would encourage courts to discuss more
transparently what they already do anyway.
4.

Doctrinal Coherence

Relatedly, the theory here would also help bring some coherence to the
Court's approach to deference. Of course, doctrinal and contextual differences
largely drive the various approaches in the cases discussed above, but the
Court nevertheless fails to explore with any rigor or consistency administrative
actors' roles in individual rights cases. Nor do courts' deference practices
actually follow from their stated justifications for deference. Courts often
justify deference on the basis of the agency's political authority and epistemic
authority, 40 2 but as we have seen, they nevertheless often defer to
administrative agencies without examining either type of authority. Courts
could then improve doctrinal coherence by practicing what they have preached.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court once paid more attention to these norms.
In 1970s cases such as Mow Sun Wong and Bakke, the Court identified the fact
of agency action and offered less deference precisely because agency, rather
than legislative, action was at issue. 403 As we have seen, more recent cases
like Grutter and Baze have decidedly moved away from that model. While
increased attention to administrative law norms might not change the outcome
of these recent cases, it would help reconcile those decisions with important
precedent.
Attention to administrative law norms in individual rights cases could also
align such cases with other doctrine. As we have seen, under various nondelegation canons, agency action implicating particular constitutional concerns
is disfavored, even though Congress itself could sometimes pass an identical
measure. 4° 4 If agency action raising federalism or due process issues is
presumptively invalid without clear legislative authorization, courts should, at
a minimum, pay closer attention to agency action implicating free speech,
401 WILLIAM

F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EXAMPLES AND

EXPLANATIONS 20 (2001).
402 See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 1078.
403 See supra notes 63-64, 107-119 and accompanying text.
404 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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equal protection, and other individual rights. In other words, courts should
review agency action allegedly infringing on individual rights in light of nondelegation canons, which view skeptically agency policies treading close to
40 5
other constitutional boundaries.
5.

Judicial Candor

Finally, the theory here could help improve judicial candor. Though courts
ostensibly grant judicial deference due to institutional concerns involving
courts' relative democratic and epistemic shortcomings, the Court's haphazard
approach suggests that its deference determinations may sometimes be shaped
by normative value judgments about the rights at issue. Closer attention to the
nature of administrative action can help courts more uniformly weigh
institutional concerns and more cleanly separate such concerns from the
substantive merits. Indeed, the Court's erratic approach to deference may
result partially from its sloppy conflation of institutional-based analysis and
substantive, rights-based analysis. While such conflation may be difficult to
avoid at times, a more rigorous examination of the relevant administrative
institution would help courts keep those inquiries distinct and more candidly
acknowledge the normative judgments they sometimes make. 40 6 Moreover,
such an approach may reflect what courts already silently do anyway. Indeed,
scholars have noted that notwithstanding Chevron's instructions, courts' actual
deference determinations in administrative law cases hinge on a variety of
40 7
functional and institutional inquiries.
Increased judicial candor, of course, is not without its costs. As Professor
Metzger explains, "A court's greater honesty about the concerns motivating its
decisions may reveal unpalatable value choices, raise obstacles to securing the
agreement of multimember bodies, or have worrying implications for future
decisions. '40 8 Nevertheless, those costs are likely outweighed by a better
understanding of the role the governmental actor plays in constitutional
40 9
decision making generally.

405

See Sunstein, supra note 207, at 331-33 (discussing constitutionally inspired non-

delegation canons).
406 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Tradeoffs of Candor: Does Judicial Transparency
Erode Legitimacy?, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 459, 466 (2009) (discussing the Court's
lack of candor when it makes normative judgments); supra notes 292-297 and
accompanying text.
407 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 286, at 1202 (summarizing the Court's complicated
continuum of deference that it has assembled "mostly through inadvertence").
408 Metzger, supra note 24, at 535.
409 See Metzger, supra note 406, at 466 (criticizing the Court's lack of "overt, normative

engagement with the real issues involved").
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Implicationsfor ConstitutionalTheory

C.

The analysis here has important implications for constitutional theory.
Perhaps most obviously, my approach suggests that the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, 4 10 however persuasive when courts review statutes, has less
presumptive force when they review agency action.4 11 Judicial deference to
legislative action on the basis of legislatures' superior political authority may
or may not be wise, but it is surely less appropriate during judicial review of an
agency action without some closer examination of the democratic legitimacy
underlying that particular action. Of course, deference might be appropriate on
we
some other ground, such as expertise, but it should be clear by now that
41 2
need a separate theory of judicial deference for administrative agencies.
The theory here also builds on recent important scholarship on
administrative constitutionalism, which recognizes that administrative and
legislative officials are not only America's policy makers, but also often its
"norm entrepreneurs. '413 Given that agency action is a dominant mechanism
for the articulation and evolution of the country's fundamental normative
commitments, 414 courts should be more sensitive to the important ways in
which administrative agencies shape constitutional meaning. 4 15 Indeed, courts'
inadequate recognition of the fact and nature of administrative action in
constitutional cases suggests that judges do not sufficiently appreciate the
significant role agencies play in guiding constitutional norms.
Relatedly, the theory here can also help determine when courts are justified
in intervening in matters usually left to administrative agents. Judicial restraint
is often premised on the belief that judges are not the proper decision maker 4to
16
address certain kinds of institutional failures such as poor prison conditions.
In contrast to courts, legislatures can arrange hearings and investigations, seek
4 17
advice, and balance resource expenditures against competing priorities.

410 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
411

See Adler, supra note 30, at 806-07 (observing that different reasons for judicial

restraint apply when courts invalidate agency action as opposed to the practice of
invalidating statutes).
412 See id. at 768 (discussing judicial restraint and the administrative state).
413 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 35, at 33.
414 See

id.

415 See, e.g., id.at 29-74 (discussing EEOC's role in reshaping the nation's attitudes
towards sex discrimination); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative

Constitutionalismand the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REv. 799, 811-44
(2010) (discussing FCC implementation of and FPC rejection of equal employment rules).
416 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) ("[U]nder the Constitution, the
first question to be answered is not whose plan is best, but in what branch of the
Government is lodged the authority to initially devise the plan."); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra
note 93, at 47-48 (discussing the emergence of Supreme Court hostility towards prison
reform litigation).
417 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litigation
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However, as Professors Rubin and Feeley explain, legislatures and agencies
are often disinclined to act, so when confronted with grave problems, some
judges believe that their imperfect judicial action is preferable to no action at
model and posit that judicial intervention
all. 418 Others, of course, reject that
419
in agency affairs is rarely justified.

Significantly, without closer inspection of the agency at issue, judges in both
camps are making these decisions without the benefit of important information
that should not be difficult to obtain. The factors identified here could help
judges better gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the agency at issue. This
determination, in turn, could help courts decide whether the agency at issue
deserves deference or, alternatively, whether judicial intervention is warranted.
Indeed, consistent with recent scholarship focusing on different institutions'
relative advantages for certain kinds of decisions, 420 the theory here would help
courts clarify the way administrative agencies are working in particular cases.
Because constitutional law revolves around the question "who decides," it is
crucial for courts to more closely examine the way relevant decision makers
42
actually operate. 1
The analysis here also can help clarify the complicated relationship between
individual rights and governmental structure and processes. 422 Some critics

Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617, 630-31 (2003).
411Id. at 631-33.
419 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230 (2006) (arguing that judges in constitutional cases
should "enforce clear and specific constitutional texts" but otherwise "eschew ambitious
forays beyond this baseline"); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 972-73 (1978) (calling for "heightened judicial sensitivity" to the
implications of "the proliferation and regularization of broad institutional relief' often
issued by courts).
420 See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right
Vehicle for Federal CorporateGovernance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225,
262-64 (2005) (discussing the factors important in considering which institution should
enact and enforce a federal rule of corporate governance); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption
and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 746-47 (2008) (describing the relevant
variables in determining which institutions are best suited to answering questions of federal
preemption); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 417, at 619-25.
421 See NEIL K. KOMESAR,

LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND

DEMAND OF RIGHTS 162 (2001) ("Constitutional law raises the central issue of who decides
who decides."); Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291,
309 (1999) ("[T]he basic question in constitutional law is often 'who decides?').
422 Cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 206 (1992) (White, J., dissenting)
("[T]he entire structure of our federal constitutional government can be traced to an interest
in establishing checks and balances to prevent the exercise of tyranny against individuals.");
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the
separation and equilibration of powers ... was not merely to assure effective government
but to preserve individual freedom."); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450
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may contend that consideration of administrative law factors in general and
political accountability in particular should not help define the scope of
individual rights, which, after all, serve as checks against democratic
overreaching. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, contends that rights are "trumps"
that prevent government from impinging on those rights. 423 Thus, the
argument goes, because individual rights check majoritarian impulses, the
constitutionality of a given policy should not turn on its democratic pedigree.
This vision of rights as trumps against the tyranny of the majority certainly
has an intuitive appeal, but it also oversimplifies the role rights play in our
constitutional structure. While individuals can sometimes invoke rights to
invalidate governmental policy, it seems reasonably clear that rights are not
trumps that necessarily invalidate all governmental action impinging on
them. 424 To the contrary, courts usually identify the boundary between an
individual right and governmental power as the point where government's
interests are no longer compelling enough to override the interests underlying
the exercise of that right.425 This vision of constitutional law recurs most
frequently in the familiar tiers of scrutiny, which allow government to intrude
on certain rights if its reasons for doing so are sufficiently compelling and
sufficiently related to the achievement of the governmental interest. 426 Under

(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Separation of powers was designed to implement a
fundamental insight: Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to
liberty."); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xii
(1998) (arguing that the Bill of Rights relied on organizational structure to protect individual
rights); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 734 (1998) ("[A] thinner line
separates the rights side of constitutionalism from the structural side than we usually
recognize .... ); Wilkinson, supra note 34, at 1687 ("[T]he supposed dichotomy between
rights and structure is never so stark as some would have it.").
423 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
424 Indeed, even Dworkin recognizes that some consideration of governmental interests is
necessary to define the scope of rights. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra
note 423, at 92 (arguing that the weight of a right is measured by its "power to withstand
such competition"); Richard H. Fallon, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27

GA. L. REv. 343, 369-71 (1993).
425 Scholars disagree as to whether this relationship is better characterized as "balancing"
or as an assessment of the kinds of reasons that the political branches may not invoke in
certain spheres. Compare Fallon, supra note 424, at 361-62 ("The definition of protected
rights depends pervasively on a balancing of the interests underlying the rights against the
interests supporting the recognition of governmental powers."), with Pildes, supra note 422,
at 733-34 ("[C]onstitutional law does not entail, as often as many think, 'balancing'. . . [but
instead] entails judicial efforts to define the kinds of reasons that are impermissible
justifications for state action in different spheres.").
426 See Pildes, supra note 422, at 734.
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current doctrine, then, constitutional rights cease to protect the individual if
427
government has a "good enough" reason for intruding.
The Court in individual rights cases has tended to focus on the government's
articulated policy interest, but it has explored less carefully the government's
more general interest in preserving the discretion of unelected administrative
agents. These governmental bureaucrats often work near the bottom of the
policy-making totem pole but, nonetheless, play a significant role in crafting
and implementing governmental policy. Left unchecked, this bureaucratic
discretion increases the potential that a government official will intrude on an
individual's rights. 428 Eliminating bureaucratic discretion, however, would
make governance all but impossible, as no system of rules can fully
accommodate the uniqueness of every particular situation.4 29 Given that these
administrative agents perform much of the government's day-to-day work, the
degree of discretion they enjoy will have substantial implications for our
constitutional system. Consequently, just as constitutional law considers more
narrowly how particular governmental interests shape certain individual rights,
so too should it more broadly consider how simultaneously to accommodate
bureaucratic discretion and individual rights.430 Indeed, these connections are
especially important, because administrative agents may be more likely to
invade individual rights when they act without sufficient oversight,
transparency, or procedural regularity. 431 A theory of deference linking the
actions of the administrative agency to individual rights more precisely, then,
could help minimize what Professor Davis called "unpleasant areas of
432
discretionary determinations.
Such an approach is a compromise between those who question the
constitutional validity of the administrative state and those who accept
administrative agencies as permanent fixtures of our constitutional
landscape. 43 3 My theory admittedly presupposes the administrative state's

427

See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional

Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 430 (2008) ("[T]his structure means that

legislatures are granted a limited power to override constitutional rights, which is validly
exercised when the relevant burden ofjustification is satisfied.").
428 See Tokaji, supra note 14, at 2409-10.
429 See DAVIS, supra note 13, at 17 ("Rules without discretion cannot fully take into
account the need for tailoring results to unique facts and circumstances of particular
cases.").
430 See id. at 25 ("[E]very truth warning of dangers or harms from discretion may be

matched by a truth about the need for and the benefits from discretion.").
431 See, e.g., id.
at 77-80 (suggesting that agency determinations should not be sufficient
to resolve individual rights questions); Bressman, supra note 24, at 493-503 (discussing the
dangers of agency arbitrariness).
432 See DAVIS, supra note 13, at 215.
433Compare Benjamin & Young, supra note 202, at 2113-14 (expressing concerns about
the constitutionality of the administrative state), and Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
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legitimacy, but it also recognizes the unique dangers that state poses. Rather
than abandoning the administrative state - which would wreak havoc on
governmental structure and policy - or conceding to its whims entirely - which
would be dangerous to democracy and liberty - this theory seeks to preserve
constitutional principles in light of the special threats administrative
bureaucracy sometimes poses.
CONCLUSION

The Court's individual rights jurisprudence pays sporadic and inadequate
attention to administrative agencies' role in our constitutional structure. While
the Court occasionally expresses concern over the fact or nature of agency
actions intruding on individual liberties, it does so neither consistently nor
systematically. This neglect is unfortunate. Administrative agencies play a
crucial role in American law, and as the Court has recognized in other
contexts, agency-made policy may raise constitutional concerns not raised by
identical legislative policy. An inquiry into administrative law norms in
individual rights cases involving agencies would help reconcile those cases
with other doctrine that recognizes that agency action is different from action
taken by the legislature or chief executive.
This inquiry would not effect a sea change in constitutional doctrine.
Instead, it would help guide the level of deference courts would grant - that is,
the lens through which courts would engage in the substantive constitutional
analysis. Given the Court's neglect of these factors to date, this approach
would likely result in more deference in several cases where the Court has paid
scant attention to the fact and nature of agency action, but the exact level of
deference would hinge on the particulars of each case. Indeed, the proposal
here would encourage greater attention to the context of agency action, thus
resisting the Court's haphazard approach. The result would be a more careful
determination of whether an administrative agency deserves wide-ranging
discretion in particular circumstances. Such a result would make practical
sense and would help demonstrate that individual rights should be understood
not in a vacuum but in reference to how the government actually functions.

Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231, 1253 (1994) ("If... one . . . follows the
New Deal architects in choosing the administrative state over the Constitution, one must
also acknowledge that all constitutional discourse is thereby rendered problematic."), with
Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH.
L. REv. 2073, 2074 (2005) (arguing that challengers to the administrative state's legitimacy
commit "intellectual sin" by "distract[ing] our attention from the government we actually
possess").

